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General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title
By David Frisch* and John D. Wladis**

EFFECT OF OTHER STATUTES UPON U.C.C.
This year several cases discussed the preemptive effect of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 1 upon state law tort and contract claims
arising from the sale of cigarettes to smokers who contracted cancer. This is
aptly illustrated by Forster v. R. ]. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,2 which was decided
by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In that case, the smoker (Forster) sued a
cigarette manufacturer (R.J. Reynolds) in strict products liability, 3 misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and negligence. 4 The cigarette manufacturer
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted all state tort claims. The trial court agreed
and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
reversed, finding no preemption of state tort claims. 6 The Minnesota Supreme
Court granted the cigarette manufacturer's petition for review and, in an en
bane decision, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The supreme court ruled
that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act preempted only those
state claims based on failure to warn theories. 6 It ruled that the strict products
liability, breach of warranty, and negligence counts were not preempted to the
*Mr. Frisch is a member of the Florida and Rhode Island bars and a professor of law at the
Widener University School of Law (formerly known as Delaware Law School of Widener
University).
**Mr. Wladis is a member of the New York bar and an associate professor of law at the Widener
University School of Law.
I. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1331-41 (1988).
2. 437 N.W.2d 655, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 370 (Minn. 1989).
3. Apparently this was a strict liability in tort claim. See 437 N.W.2d at 661, 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 374.
4. The smoker's wife was also a plaintiff. She alleged loss of consortium. Both plaintiffs also
sought punitive damages.
5. 423 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
6. The preemption was held not to be retroactive. Thus claims arising before the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was enacted could be asserted even on failure to warn
theories. 437 N.W.2d at 66. This holding is consistent with other cases. See, e.g., Kotler v. American
Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 18, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1074, 1078 (D. Mass.
1988); Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D.N.j. 1986) (holding based on
agreement of the parties).
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extent that they were not based on such theories. In effect this left the smoker
free to pursue claims based on defects in cigarettes; 7 but, the court did not
resolve the question of whether cigarettes can be defective because they are
addictive and harmful to health. 8 The court also held that a claim of misrepresentation arising from alleged false st:ttements made in cigarette advertising was
not preempted. 9

THE INTERACTION OF TORT AND CONTRACT
ECONOMIC LOSS
The economic loss doctrine continues to make headway. This doctrine bars
suit in negligence or strict liability in tort by commercial buyers of defective
products who suffer purely economic loss.
Two cases applied the economic loss doctrine to suits on contracts for
professional services. In Employer's Insurance v. Suwannee River Spa Lines,
Inc., 10 the United States Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit applied the economic loss doctrine to admiralty claims arising out of contracts for the construction of ocean-going tugbarges. One of the barges sunk and the others could not
be used until the cause of the sinking had been ascertained and preventative
repairs had been made. The owner of the barges (Occidental), seeking compensation for the sinking, for repairs to the remaining barges, and for loss of use,
sued a host of defendants responsible for the construction of the barges. Included
among the defendants were the builder (Avondale) and the construction supervisors (Hvide). The owner claimed breach of contract or warranty and negligent
performance of contract against each of these defendants. The negligence claims
appear to have been pleaded to avoid the limitation of liability clause in each
contract. The district court found both the builder and the supervisor to be
liable for breach of contract and for negligent performance. u On appeal, both
builder and supervisor alleged that they could not be held liable in negligence.
The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed. It held that the economic loss doctrine

7. Accord Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 685 F. Supp. 15, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1074 (D. Mass. 1988); Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 578 nn. 46, 51, 52 (3d
Cir. 1990).
8. 437 N.W.2d at 661 n.8. The resolution of this question depends, in large measure, on
whether or not a court adopts the position set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
Comment i, (1965) (products like tobacco and whiskey even though addictive and harmful to health
are not defective unless foreign substances added).
9. But see Cipollone, 893 F.2d 541 (intentional torts arising from advertising or promotion of
cigarettes are preempted).
10. 866 F.2d 752, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 659 (5th Cir. 1989).
11. The district court found the builder's liability limitation clause to have effectively disclaimed
tort liability; the court found the supervisor's liability limitation clause did not cover tort liability.
Id. at 757, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 664. The other defendants were dismissed from
the suit.
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applied to contracts for professional services and barred liability in negligence
for the economic loss the plaintiff alleged in this case. 12
In Werner & Pfleider Corp. v. Gary Chemical Corp., 13 the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, applying New Jersey law, also
held the economic loss doctrine applicable to a contract for services. 14 In that
case, the buyer (Gary Chemical) purchased a plastics processing machine from
a distributor (WPC). When the machine failed to perform as expected, the
buyer withheld a part of the purchase price. Upon suit by the distributor for the
price, the buyer counterclaimed for economic loss based on, inter alia, negligent
supervision, negligent design, and fraud. 15 These claims were made to avoid a
limitation of liability clause contained in the contract. The court held that under
New Jersey law 16 both the negligence and fraud claims were barred. Consequently, it granted summary judgment against the buyer on those claims.
In several cases, buyers of goods sued their sellers in tort for economic loss.
Apparently each did so to avoid contractual remedy limitations or limited
warranty clauses in their contracts. In each case the courts barred the tort
claims. In Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, lnc., 17 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the commercial buyer of a backhoe cannot
sue the remote manufacturer in negligence or strict liability in tort for purely
economic loss where the buyer has accepted repairs under a manufacturer's
warranty which specifically limited liability to the furnishing of replacement
parts.

12. The Fifth Circuit also upheld the builder's liability limitation clause. Id. at 776-80, 8
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 675-80.
13. 697 F. Supp. 808, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1064 (D.N.J. 1988).
14. Courts are split on whether the economic loss doctrine can apply to contracts for services. In
favor of such aµplication are the following cases: Employers Ins. v. Suwannee River Spa Lines, Inc.,
866 F.2d 752, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 659 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying federal admiralty
law); cf East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 609 (1986) (same); Flinkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942 (11th Cir. 1982)
(applying Georgia law). Cases against such application include: Consol. Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 358, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1496 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(applying New York law); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 664 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 242 (2d Cir. 1988). Cases reserving judgment include:
Republic Steel Corp. v. Penn. Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 183 n.13, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1319, 1327-28 n.13 (7th Cir. 1986) (question not reached because contract found to be
predominantly for sale of goods); Adams Laboratories Inc. v. Jacobs Eng'g Co., 761 F.2d 1218,
1223-24 (7th Cir. 1985) (question not reached but court described Illinois law on point as "far from
clear").
15. The buyer also counterclaimed for breach of the distributor's warranty and instituted a third
party action against the manufacturer of the machine as a third party beneficiary of the express
warranty given by the manufacturer to the distributor. The court held that these claims survived
summary judgment to the extent that they sought damages permissible under the limitation of
liability clauses contained in each warranty.
16. Spring Motors Distrib. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660, 40 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1184 ( 1985 ).
17. 148 Wis. 2d 910, 437 N.W.2d 213, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 652 (1989).
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In Rust-Pru/ Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 18 the Michigan Court of Appeals
rejected a similar claim. In that case, a rust-proofing company, asserting the
rights of customers' vehicles it had rust-proofed, sued the manufacturer of the
vehicles in tort. The rust-proofing company claimed defective design or manufacture of the vehicles, which it alleged had prevented it from adequately
treating the vehicles. The suit was in tort because the manufacturer's sale
warranty had expired before the problem surfaced. Based on Michigan law, 19
the court affirmed the granting of summary judgment against the rust-proofer. 20

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
In Childs v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 21 a Virginia circuit court determined that its legislature's enactment of U.C.C. section 2-318 precluded the
judicial adoption of strict liability in tort. However, the weight of authority is
decidedly against this view. 22 Though the few courts adopting this view speak of
legislative preclusion or preemption, they do not provide any direct evidence
that either the drafters of the article 2 warranty provisions 23 or the particular
state legislature intended such effect. The real issues here are not whether
enactment of the U.C.C. in any particular jurisdiction has preempted strict
liability in tort, for usually there is no indication that the legislature even
considered the question. The real issues are whether contract-based defenses,
such as warranty disclaimer, should bar suits for personal injury by remote
purchasers and, if not, whether the more appropriate institution to adopt strict
liability in tort is the judiciary or the legislature. Unfortunately, these issues are
not likely to disappear and may even become more pressing now that states have
begun to enact the new article 2A. That article codifies personal property
leasing and includes warranty sections analogous to those in article 2. 24
Misuse of the goods is a defense to both tort and warranty claims against the
manufacturer or seller. The effect of the defense can vary between tort and
contract, and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Sometimes, the defense completely bars any recovery, as under a contributory negligence or assumption of
18. 172 Mich. App. 58, 431 N.W.2d 245, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1058 (1988).
19. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty's Inc., 154 Mich. App. 634, 397 N.W.2d 853, 2 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1526, appeal denied, 428 Mich. 874 (1987).
20. See also Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 708 F. Supp. 708, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 690 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (apparently applying Pennsylvania law) (former purchaser of
herbicide cannot sue remote manufacturer in tort for crop loss allegedly caused by failure of
herbicide).
21. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1080 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988).
22. See Annotation, Pre-emption of Strict Liability in Tort by Provisions of U.C.C. article 2, 15
A.L.R. 4th 791 (1982 & 1989 Supp.).
23. For evidence that the drafters of article 2 did not intend preemption, see Wade, Is Section
402 A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the U.C.C. and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 123 (1974).
24. See U.C.C. §§ 2A-210 to 216. The drafters of article 2A intended not to "change the
development of the relationship or' strict liability in tort to the provisions of the U.C.C.; id. § 2A216, Official Comment.
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risk system; sometimes it only reduces the amount of recovery, as under a
comparative fault system. 25 Coter v. Barber-Green Co., 26 decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, illustrates this point. In that case, a worker
was severely injured while using a machine which he knew to be defective. The
worker sued the manufacturer (Barber-Greene) and the seller of the machine
(New England). The jury concluded that both defendants were liable in
negligence. Since Massachusetts had adopted a comparative fault system for
negligence, the jury apportioned the negligence. In so doing it found the
worker's conduct in using a machine he knew to be defective to be contributory
negligence and reduced the recovery accordingly. On the warranty claim, the
jury found that recovery was completely barred by the worker's conduct. After
several post-trial motions, the trial judge gave judgment for the worker. On
appeal, the seller and the manufacturer contended that the jury's decision on the
warranty count required a similar finding on the negligence count. The court
rejected this argument, reasoning that each count was based upon a separate
theory of liability. In warranty, plaintiff's misuse of a product could bar its
recovery. In negligence, however, misuse did not necessarily bar recovery
because Massachusetts had enacted a comparative negligence statute. The court
concluded its decision by indicating that a comparative fault system perhaps
should be adopted in warranty but left that decision to the legislature.
Several recent cases have permitted plaintiffs to assert traditional tort defenses or theories of recovery in breach of warranty actions. In Castrignano v.
E.R. Squibb &- Sons, lnc., 21 the Rhode Island Supreme Court permitted a drug
manufacturer to raise the "unavoidably unsafe" defense 28 in a personal injury
warranty action. In that case, plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal
injuries she allegedly suffered in utero when her mother took DES, a synthetic
hormone, prescribed for plaintiff's mother to prevent the mother from spontaneously miscarrying the plaintiff. She sued the drug manufacturer in federal court
on several theories, of which the trial judge submitted four to the jury; negligence, strict liability in tort, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and
breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. The jury found for
the plaintiff on the strict liability and warranty of merchantability counts. The
drug manufacturer moved for a new trial, contending that the jury charge had
not included the "unavoidably unsafe" defense. Before ruling on the motion, the
25. See generally B. Clark & C. Smith, The Law of Product Warranties 'II 12.03[8] (1984 and
1988 Cum. Supp.)
26. 403 Mass. 50, 525 N.E.2d 1305, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 375 (1988).
27. 546 A.2d 775, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1423 (R.I. 1988).
28. The "unavoidably unsafe" defense is described in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
Comment k (1965). Basically, the defense applies to products such as drugs or vaccines which are
incapable of being made completely safe for their intended and ordinary use but which nevertheless
serve very beneficial functions. For example, the vaccine used in the Pasteur treatment for rabies can
itself cause serious injury. However, since the disease if left untreated leads to a horrible death, the
unavoidably high risk involved in administering the vaccine is justified, if the product is properly
prepared and accompanied by adequate warnings and instructions. Thus Comment k states that the
seller of such vaccine is not liable under § 402A.
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federal trial judge certified several questions to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. In response to those questions, the supreme court held: (i) the plaintiff
could maintain her strict liability and warranty of merchantability claims on
these facts; (ii) the "unavoidably unsafe" defense was available against both
claims; and (iii) the application of the defense was a mixed question of law and
fact on which the defendant bore the burden of proof.
In Yates v. Norton Co., 29 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court permitted a plaintiff to assert an implied warranty of merchantability claim on a
failure to warn theory. In that case, a worker suffered fatal injury by inhaling
noxious fumes while wearing a respirator. The administratrix of the worker's
estate sued the manufacturer of the respirator for breach of warranty and
negligence. The jury returned a verdict for the manufacturer on both counts. On
appeal, the supreme judicial court reversed and remanded for a new trial on
both counts. As to the warranty count, the court found the jury charge to have
been deficient because it did not clearly tell the jury that failure to give adequate
warnings constituted a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

ARTICLE TWO-SALES OF GOODS
CONTRACT FORMATION AND TERMS
Statute of Frauds
In view of the questionable need for a modern day statute of frauds, 30 it is not
surprising to encounter philosophical differences of opinion, often among members of the same court. Consider the majority and dissenting opinions of the
New York Court of Appeals in Bazak International Corp. v. Mast lndustries, 31
involving the merchant's exception to the statute of frauds under U.C.C. section
2-201 (2). 32 The confirmatory documents were, according to the buyer (Bazak),
five printed purchase-order forms bearing the date of the alleged oral contract.
Each contained the handwritten words, "As prisented [sic] by Karen Fedorko,"
(a reference to the seller's agent who had dealt with buyer) and in small print,

29. 403 Mass. 70, 525 N.E.2d 1317, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1441 (1988).
30. The future of U.C.C. § 2-201 is one of the many areas being considered by the study
committee formed by the Permanent Editorial Board to review article 2 and to consider whether it
should be revised. This subject was also one of the topics of discussion at the meeting of the
Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Sales, and Documents of Title in Houston, Texas
(Spring, 1989). Of those present, some thought the statute should be retained in its present form;
some were of the opinion it should be retained, but revised; and some favored scrapping it
altogether.
31. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1380 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).
32. Other such cases decided during this survey period include Hilord Chemical Corp. v. Ricoh
Electronics, Inc., 875 F.2d 32, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 904 (2d Cir. 1989); Polygram,
S.A. v. 32-03 Enter. Inc., 697 F. Supp. 132, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 914 (E.D.N.Y.
1988); Adams v. Petrade Int'l Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 369 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988). See also Comment, The Merchant's Exception to the Uniform Commercial Code's
Statute of Frauds, 32 Viii. L. Rev. 133 (1987).
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the following: "This is only an offer and not a contract unless accepted in
writing by the seller, and subject to prior sale." 33
The first task for the court of appeals was to formulate the applicable
standard for determining whether a document qualifies as a confirmation. 34 It
rejected the conclusion reached by several courts that explicit words of confirmation or an express reference to the prior agreement is necessary. 35 Rather, the
court was of the opinion that the degree of explicitness required under subsections ( 1) and (2) of U.C.C. section 2-201 should be the same. That is, a
document is a confirmation under subsection (2) if it is "sufficient against the
sender" under subsection ( 1 ). Such would be the case if, assuming the other
requirements are met, the document is "sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made." 36 According to the court, this standard was met. 37 The date
and specificity of the orders, along with the mention of a presentation by Karen
Fedorko, suggested that a previous agreement had been reached. The "offer"
language on the forms was thought to be irrelevant since it appeared that much
of the content of each form, including this language, was intended to be effective
only when buyer was acting in the capacity of a seller.
The dissent saw things quite differently. The point made was that, notwithstanding the standard adopted by the court, the orders were at best ambiguous.
According to Justice Alexander, they did not lead one to conclude that an
existing contract was more probable than not. 38
The court's decision that a document's sufficiency under U.C.C. section 2201 (2) should depend on its sufficiency under subsection (1) seems correct. The
purpose of the merchant's exception was to take from the recipient of the
confirmation the opportunity to speculate at the sender's expense. If the sender
has lost the statute's protection, the recipient should also, unless the existence of
a contract is timely disavowed. To require more from a confirmation than
satisfaction of subsection ( 1) is to expose the sender to the risk of the same
inequitable conduct that the drafters in subsection (2) sought to eliminate.
However, the court's conclusion that the purchase orders met the test of
subsection (1) was questionable. Because of the inherent indeterminacy of that
test, much will depend upon the decisionmaker's attitude toward the statute. In
33. Furthermore, each purchase order was transmitted to seller through facilities located at the
office of its own parent company in New York. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1384.
34. The court excluded from consideration parol evidence on the theory that to permit evidence
extrinsic to the documents would frustrate the purposes of the statute. Id. at 1383.
35. See Trilco Terminal v. Prebuilt Corp., 167 N.J. Super. 449, 400 A.2d 1237, 26 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 616, ajfd without opinion, 174 N.J. Super. 24, 415 A.2d 356 (1980);
Normanjil Sportswear Corp. v. TG& Y Stores Co., 644 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
36. u.c.c. § 2-201 ( 1 ).
37. At the outset, the court was careful to remind the reader that its disposition of the statute of
frauds issue was in no way intended to resolve the underlying dispute. The plaintiff must still prove
that a contract existed. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1383.
38. This, it was argued, is a finding that even the most liberal construction of U.C.C. § 2-201(1)
requires. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1392. Justice Alexander believed that, at best, the
documents allowed "for equally probable inferences that the parties either engaged only in
negotiations or entered a contract." Id. at 1394.
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any event, the lesson of the case is clear: to guarantee the protection of the
statute, the only safe course is to respond to all communications addressing the
sale or purchase of goods.
A difference in attitude also divided the Second Circuit in Trebor Sportwear
Co. v. The Limited Stores, /nc. 39 The issue was whether a cover letter and draft
agreement, prepared as part of an effort to settle an ongoing dispute between the
parties, were properly admissible to satisfy the statute of frauds. The trial court
refused to consider either document on the grounds that they constituted an offer
of settlement, and thus were inadmissible under rule 408 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that exclusion of this evidence
was not an abuse of discretion. Although the proffer was for a purpose other
than to prove or disprove the validity of the underlying claim, the court was of
the opinion that the policy of rule 408 militated against consideration of this
material. 40
While it is certainly true, as the majority suggests, that satisfying the statute
is the first step toward ultimate victory, it is doubtful whether admission of
documents for this purpose will impact in any significant way on settlement
negotiations. Although a statute of frauds defense matters when litigation
ensues, it seems reasonable to assume that preservation of that defense is not a
major pre-litigation concern.
In DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 41 the Seventh Circuit was faced with the
"judicial admission" exception to the statute. 42 The members of this court, too,
could not agree on the result. The facts were simple. Plaintiff alleged an oral
contract to buy a chair designed by Frank Lloyd Wright. Defendant moved to
dismiss and filed in support, thereof, an affidavit that she never agreed to sell the
chair to plaintiff. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant despite
plaintiff's contention that it should be given the opportunity to depose defendant
in order to elicit an involuntary admission.
The Seventh Circuit, on appeal, affirmed. Rejecting a statement by J. White
and R. Summers that a statute of frauds' defense must always be determined at
trial because the defendant might, in cross-examination, admit the making of
the contract, 43 the court distinguished the case before it from one where there is
only an unsupported assertion that no contract had been made. Where, as in
39. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 975 (2d Cir. 1989).
40. Conceding that evidence offered for "another purpose" is not necessarily barred by rule 408,
the court was quick to adopt the cautionary warning that "care should be taken that an indiscriminate and mechanistic application of this 'exception' to rule 408 does not result in undermining the
rule's public policy objective." Id. at 982 (citing 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence
408[05], 408-31 (1988)). Since overcoming the statute of frauds is the first step toward establishing
liability, the court felt constrained to decide the case the way it did. The dissent, on the other hand,
saw the nexus between being able to satisfy the statute and being able to prove the existence of an
oral contract as too attenuated to implicate the policy considerations underlying rule 408 if evidence
is offered solely to accomplish the former. Id. at 983 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
41. 851 F.2d 920, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1396 (7th Cir. 1988).
42. See U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
43. 851 F.2d at 922-23, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1398.
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this case, the denial is under oath, the remote possibility of a subsequent
admission does not justify further litigation. 44 The dissent thought otherwise. In
the opinion of Judge Flaum, the decision whether to allow further discovery
should lie within the trial court's discretion. In this case, Judge Flaum believed
the district court abused that discretion. 45
Perhaps a compromise position is possible. Why not allow discovery limited
to the statute of frauds' issue? If no admission is obtained, the case could then be
dismissed.

Parol Evidence Rule
Everybody knows that section 2-202 (the U.C.C. version of the parol evidence
rule) has discarded the requirement that a final 46 writing's terms be ambiguous
before extrinsic evidence can be introduced to explain the meaning of the terms.
Well not quite. The Official Comment to that section throws out the ambiguity
prerequisite only for "the type of evidence specified in paragraph (a)"; that is,
course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance. 47 Each of these
terms is defined in the Code. 48 As for extrinsic evidence, such as statements, or
other conduct of parties during their negotiations which do not fit into one of
these three categories, courts still require that the writing be ambiguous before
such evidence is admissible. 49
This point is illustrated in Apple Valley Red-E-Mix, Inc. v. Mills-Win.field
Engineering Sales, Inc., 50 decided by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. In that
case, the plaintiff leased a cement unloading machine. The contract contained
44. The diverse views on this subject are discussed in Triangle Mktg., Inc. v. Action Indus., Inc.,
630 F. Supp. 1578, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 36 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
45. Missing from defendant's affidavit was a blanket denial that an agreement had been reached.
Defendant stated only that she did not accept plaintiff's offer to purchase the chair and did not recall
having a particular conversation with plaintiff's representative.
46. "Final" here means that the writing is integrated. In Code terms it is "intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement." U.C.C. § 2-202.
47. Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-202 Official Comment l(c).
48. For definitions of "course of dealing" and "usage of trade" see U.C.C. § 1-205; for "course
of performance" see U.C.C. § 2-208.
49. See, e.g., Shephard v. Top Hat Land & Cattle Co., 560 P.2d 730, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 760 (Wyo. 1977); Central Jersey Dodge Truck Center, Inc. v. Sightseer Corp., 608
F.2d 1106, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1256 (6th Cir. 1979); Durbano Metals Inc. v. A&K
R.R. Materials, Inc., 574 P.2d 1159, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 299 (Utah 1978); Rainer
Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d 389, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 287 (1981); Paragon Resources Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 723 F.2d 419, 37
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1482 (5th Cir. 1984); Harper v. Calvert, 687 S.W.2d 227, 39
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore,
Inc., 636 F. Supp. 285, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 59 (W.D. Va. 1986) rev'd, 884 F.2d
1388 (4th Cir. 1989); Ci bro Petroleum Prods, v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., 602 F. Supp. 1520,
40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1220 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
50. 436 N.W.2d 121, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). For a
similar ruling, see Warnaco Inc. v. Farkas, 872 F.2d 539, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 427
(2d Cir. 1989) (evidence of proposal made during negotiations inadmissible to explain language of
written guarantee where language was unambiguous).
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an express warranty of merchantability, effectively disclaiming all other warranties, and included a merger clause stating that the written lease contained the
entire contract of the parties. The lessee sued for breach of warranty, claiming
that the machine failed to meet an unloading rate stated by the lessor but not
included in the lease. The trial court found the machine's description in the
lease, "Docksider 11-V," to be ambiguous, and so admitted extrinsic evidence of
the seller's unloading rate statement. It then found for the buyer. On appeal, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded that the description was not
ambiguous and that the lease was not so incomplete on warranties as to permit
evidence of the extrinsic statement. 51
Buyers who fail to read invoices packaged with goods sent to them may be
bound by the terms of the invoice. A court could hold the invoice to be a final
expression of the terms contained in the invoice with the consequence that the
buyer cannot introduce extrinsic evidence, written or oral, to contradict or
explain its terms. 52 This is precisely what happened to the buyer in Polygram,
S.A. v. 32-03 Enterprises, Inc., decided by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York. 53 In that case, the buyer had been a
distributor of seller's phonograph records, tapes, and compact discs for some
time. It received several shipments of these goods, each of which was accompanied by an invoice. Each invoice contained a clause requiring any claim
concerning the goods (including claims of defects) to be made within three
calendar months after delivery. The buyer did not object to any of the terms in
the invoices and eventually issued checks to pay for each shipment. When these
checks were dishonored, the seller sued for the contract price of each shipment.
The buyer defended asserting the statute of frauds and defects in the goods. The
seller moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted. The court
disposed of the statute of frauds defense on the grounds that the buyer's failure
to give written notice of objection to the invoices foreclosed it from asserting that

51. The court applied common law and cited § 2-202 in passing, apparently because this was a
lease rather than a sale. Minnesota has since enacted article 2A which governs leases of goods.
Minn. Stat. Ann.§§ 336.2A-101-531(West1990). However this would not change the result here,
because the article 2A parol evidence rule(§ 2A-202) is identical to the article 2 parol evidence rule.
52. Compare the effect of an invoice under subsection 2-201(2) (see 2 R. Anderson, Anderson on
the U.C.C. §§ 2-201:133-134 (3d ed. (1982)) and under§ 2-207; e.g., Interlake, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 16, 637 P.2d 464, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 171
( 1981) rev'd, 231 Kan. 251, 644 P.2d 385 (1982); Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d
758, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1076 (10th Cir. 1983); Therma-Coustics Mfg., Inc. v.
Borden, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 282, 213 Cal. Rep. 611, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1640
(1985); Rangen, Inc. v. Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 104 Idaho 284, 658 P.2d 955, 35 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 52, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1129 (1983); Offen, Inc. v. Rocky Mt.
Constructors Inc., 765 P.2d 600, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 47 (Cqlo. Ct. App. 1988). But
see Trust Co. Bank v. Barrett Distrib., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 959, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
986 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (contract formed when seller shipped goods); In re Isis Foods, Inc., 38 Bankr.
48, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1134 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (same).
53. 697 F. Supp. 132; 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
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defense under section 2-201.s• The court disposed of the defects in the goods
defense on the grounds that the buyer had not timely notified the seller of
breach. The court also declined to consider a letter sent by seller to buyer prior
to the shipments in question, which the buyer characterized as permitting an
open-ended return policy. It did so on the grounds that the invoice was, under
section 2-202, a final expression of the parties' agreement on the return policy
which could not be contradicted by the letter.ss In the court's view, the buyer
assented to the terms of the invoice by accepting the goods which accompanied
the invoice.s 6 This case is consistent with others that have held invoices to be
final expressions for purposes of section 2-202.s 7

Battle of the Forms
Often in battle of the forms cases, one side will sign the other side's form.
Usually the signing party is held to be bound to the terms of the form he signed
regardless of whether he read the form. 58 In one case decided this year, Weyher/
Livsey Constructors, Inc. v. International Chemical Co.,s 9 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit indicated that this is not always so. In
that case, the buyer (Weyher) purchased coal for use in testing boilers it was
manufacturing for the army. It sent a purchase order for the coal to the seller,
who signed it without objection. The purchase order set forth coal size specifications. On the back of the form was a clause in which the seller was said to
warrant the goods sold for one year. The clauses on the back were very difficult
to read and, in the words of trial court, "border on being illegible." 60 Several
months after the last delivery of coal, the buyer notified the seller that the coal
did not conform to the size specifications. The buyer resold the coal, covered,
and sued for damages. After the buyer had finished presenting its evidence at
trial, the trial court granted the seller's motion for an involuntary dismissal. It
held that the warranty clause was unenforceable, because it was not conspicuous
under the U.C.C. The basis for the dismissal apparently was a failure of the
54. The court applied subsection 2-201(2) (written confirmation under some circumstance can
disable recipient from asserting statute of frauds if he does not object to it in writing within 10 days
of receipt).
55. In passing, the court noted that, even if the letter had been considered, the result would be no
different, since the letter did not support the buyer's characterization of it.
56. The court also held that the invoice term on giving notice of returns was not unconscionable
and that the time period allowed by that term for giving notice was not manifestly unreasonable
under U.C.C. § 1-204.
57. See, e.g., Battista v. Radesi, 112 A.D.2d 42, 491 N.Y.S.2d 81, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 748 (App. Div. 1985); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Fairway Dodge Sales,
Inc., 80 A.D.2d 740, 437 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 1981); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Jaiswal, 93
A.D.2d 969, 463 N.Y.S.2d 78, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1414 (App. Div. 1983); Morrison
v. Devore Trucking, Inc., 68 Ohio App. 2d 140, 428 N.E.2d 438, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
779 ( 1980); Liberty Enters., Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co., 679 S.W.2d 779, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 773 (Tex. App: 1984), ajfd in part, 690 S.W.2d 570 (1985).
58. See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 410 (3d ed. 1987).
59. 864 F.2d 130, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 646 (11th Cir. 1989).
60. Id. at 132, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 648.
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buyer to give timely notice of breach, and the buyer seems to have argued that
the warranty clause gave it at least one year to notify of breach. On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. It held that the trial court applied the
wrong standard in determining whether the warranty clause was part of the
contract. The U.C.C. requires that only certain clauses, such as warranty
disclaimers, be conspicuous; there is no U.C.C. requirement for express warranties. The court stated that the trial court should apply general contract
principles to determine whether the warranty was enforceable. Under general
contract principles, courts traditionally do not enforce clauses against signers if
the clauses are not legible or if they have not sufficiently been called to the
attention of the signer. 61 Thus on remand, the seller may well be held not to be
bound to the warranty clause even though he signed the form containing the
clause.

Warranties
Warranty Of Title
Does the warranty of title run to remote purchasers or only to immediate
purchasers? The courts are split. 62 The text and Official Comments to U.C.C.
section 2-312 are silent on the question; nor do the drafters seem to have had the
warranty of title in mind when they devised U.C.C. section 2-318 which
permits certain classes of persons to sue as third party beneficiaries of express or
implied warranties. 63
According to Williston, under pre-Code law the warranty of title ran only to
the immediate buyer. 64 Even if the immediate buyer assigned its rights under the
warranty to the next purchaser, that purchaser could recover only for the injury
to the immediate buyer and not for its own injury, since it was asserting the
rights of the immediate buyer, not its own rights. 65 Yet even though the
warranty did not run to the remote purchaser, the seller could not escape
liability for injury to that purchaser. The remote purchaser could recover from
its seller, the immediate buyer, who in turn could recover from its seller
compensation for direct injury to it and also for damages which the immediate
buyer had to pay to the remote purchaser. Thus, the original seller ultimately
would be liable for the injury caused to each successive purchaser. This result
61. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 58, at 411-14.
62. See Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales Bulk, Transfers, and Documents of Title, 44
Bus. Law. 1445, 1455 n.46 (1989). See also Crook Motor Co. v. Goolsby, 703 F. Supp. 511, 8
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 363 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that warranty of title runs only
to immediate purchaser).
63. The drafting history of U.C.C. § 2-318 indicates that the drafters were concerned with the
warranties of quality, not the title warranty. See, e.g., A.L.l., Uniform Revised Sales Act, Comment
on Section 43 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 Apr. 27, 1944); reprinted in 2 Uniform Commercial
Code: Drafts 163-67 ( 1984 ).
64. 1 S. Williston, The Law Governing Sales of Goods at Common Law and Under the
Uniform Sales Act § 244, at 645, 648 (I 948).
65. Id. at 647.
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required a multiplicity of actions. This cumbersome procedure, together with
the demise of the privity requirement for warranties of quality, may well
account for those cases which hold that the warranty of title under U.C.C.
section 2-312 runs to the remote purchaser.
In Brokke v. Williams, 66 the Montana Supreme Court held that the warranty
of title is not disclaimed where the goods were sold "as is." In that case, the
buyer purchased a camera from a pawnbroker, who had posted large fluorescent
signs on his premises stating that he sold merchandise "as is. " 67 He wrote
similar legends on his sales slips. Later, it was determined that the camera had
been stolen and the buyer surrendered it to the police. The buyer then sued the
seller for breach of the warranty of title. The court gave judgment for the buyer.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the posting of
"as is" signs was not sufficient to disclaim the warranty of title under U.C.C.
subsection 2-312(2). It also emphasized that the warranty of title could not be
disclaimed under U.C.C. section 2-316 (which permits "as is" disclaimers to be
effective). 68 This decision is consistent with other cases requiring that, to be an
effective disclaimer under subsection 2-312(2), language or circumstances must
specifically call to the buyer's attention the fact that the seller is not claiming
that he has title or that the seller is selling only such right or title as he is able to
sell. Thus, typical quitclaim language in bills of sale, which recites that the
seller is transferring his "right, title and interest," has been held to be ineffective
to disclaim the warranty of title. 69

Implied Warranties
In Gall v. Allegheny County Health Dept., 70 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held the implied warranty of merchantability attached to the sale of water
by a municipality through its municipal water system. It also held that the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose did not attach to such a sale.
In that case, plaintiffs became ill with giardiasis 71 after drinking water furnished by the municipality. They sued the municipality and the municipal
water authority for breach of both implied warranties. The trial court dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, the commonwealth court affirmed on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. On
66. 766 P.2d 1311, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1404 (Mont. 1989).
67. There was a factual dispute as to whether the signs were in place when the buyer entered
the pawn shop. Id. at 1312, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1405. The court said this dispute
was irrelevant and treated the case as if the signs had been in place.
68. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-312 Official Comment 6 (title warranty not subject to
U.C.C. § 2-316(3)).
69. See Clark & Smith, supra note 25 at ii 3.03 ( 1984 & 1988 Cum. Supp.).
70. 521 Pa. 68, 555 A.2d 786, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 379 (1989). See also Miller
v. McKeesport Mun. Water Auth., 521 Pa. 77, 555 A.2d 790 (1987) (municipality and its water
authority could be held liable in negligence and breach of contract for illness and economic loss
caused by same tainted water involved in Gall case).
71. Giardiasis is a disease caused by parasitic protozoa tha1 attack the intestines. See IV
Encyclopaedia Britannica-Micropaedia 528 (1974) (entry under "Giardia lamblia").
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further appeal, the supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part. It
concluded that the sale of water by a municipality was a sale of goods within
U.C.C. article 2. The court then concluded that the implied warranty of
merchantability 72 was attached to the sale. 73 Lastly, the court ruled that the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 74 did not attach to a sale of
water for drinking or household purposes. 75
In Koperwas u. Publix Supermarkets, lnc., 76 a Florida court of appeals,
applying the "reasonable expectation" test, held that the presence of a clam
shell in a can of clam chowder, as a matter of law, did not constitute lack of
reasonable care in the manufacture of the chowder. In that case, the plaintiff
injured her tooth when she bit down on the shell while eating the chowder. She
sued both the supermarket from which she purchased the chowder and the
manufacturer for breach of implied warranty. At the close of plaintiff's case, the
trial court directed a verdict for the defendants. On appeal, the court affirmed,
stating that a consumer could reasonably anticipate and guard against a piece of
clam shell in a bowl of clam chowder. 77

Warranty Disclaimers
Conspicuousness is one of the requirements under U.C.C. section 2-316(2)
for disclaiming or modifying the implied warranties of merchantability or of
fitness for a particular purpose. Whether a clause is conspicuous is a question of
law. 78 The definition of "conspicuous" provides that, "[a] term or clause is
conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to
operate ought to have noticed it." 79 The definition continues by declaring that a
printed heading in capitals, or language in the body of a form that is printed in
larger or other contrasting type or color, is conspicuous. 80 Suppose that the
disclaimer language in a form is printed in contrasting type or color but is
located on the back of the form so that a reasonable person might not have
noticed it. Is it conspicuous? Courts are divided on the question. Some courts
72. U.C.C. § 2-314. The court did not discuss whether either of the defendants was a merchant,
possibly because the matter was not made an issue by the parties.
73. Accord 35 Op. Comptroller, No. 79-880, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 330 (N.Y.
Comp!. 1980); contra Coast Laundry Inc. v. Lincoln City, 9 Or. App. 521, 497 P.2d 1224, 10
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1379 ( 1972) (no implied warranties on theory that sale of water by
municipality is not a sale of goods).
74. U.C.C. § 2-315. Contra 35 Op. Comptroller, No. 79-880, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 330 (N.Y.
Comp!. 1980).
75. The court also ruled that plaintiffs had stated a claim under Pennsylvania's Governmental
Immunities Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542(b)(5) (Purdon 1982).
76. 534 So. 2d 872, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
77. Accord Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309, 2 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 161 (1964) (presence of fish bone in fish chowder does not constitute breach
of implied warranties). But see O'Brien v. Ferguson Catering, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1434 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1988) (presence of bone in chicken pie constitutes breach of warranty).
78. u.c.c. § 1-201(10).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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find location on the back of the form to be a factor in determining that the
disclaimer is not conspicuous. 81 Other courts find the clause not to be conspicuous if there is not an adequate reference on the front of the form to the terms
appearing on the back. 82 The application of these principles is illustrated by
Sierra Diesel Injection Service, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 83 decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In that case, the buyer purchased
a computer and software for bookkeeping and invoicing. The purchased items
did not perform as promised so the buyer purchased another computer from the
same seller, which also did not perform as promised. A computer consultant
retained by the buyer informed it that the computer was incapable of performing as promised. Consequently, the buyer purchased a replacement computer
from another seller and sued the first seller. The trial court found for the buyer,
concluding that the seller had breached its contract and the implied warranty of
merchantability. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the
seller's warranty disclaimers, which were printed in bold contrasting type, but
on the reverse side of the form signed by the buyer, were not conspicuous. In so
doing, the court relied upon the buyer's relative unsophistication in the areas of
computers and contracts. 84

Third Party Beneficiaries Of Warranties
Almost 25 years ago Prosser proclaimed the fall of the citadel of privity 85 in
warranty actions. Yet the passage of time has demonstrated that pockets of
resistance still remain. This is so because lack of privity is still a defense in
certain circumstances in many jurisdictions. The article 2 section intended to
deal with privity (section 2-318) does not, in any of its recommended versions,
abolish privity entirely. Further, some courts have declined to extend the partial
abolition embodied in their state's version of section 2-318 to situations beyond
that version.
Thus in Gowen v. Cady, 86 the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that lack of
privity was a complete defense to a personal injury warranty action where the
plaintiff was not within the class of persons for whom Georgia's U.C.C. section
2-318 abolished privity. Georgia's section 2-318 abolishes privily for family
members and guests in the buyer's home who might reasonably be expected to
use and be injured by the product. 87 Mr. and Mrs. Cady sued the manufacturer
81. Annot., 73 A.L.R. 3d 248 § 12[b] at 293-95 (1976 and 1989 Supp.). Often the buyer's lack
of sophistication in legal matters is a factor as well. Id.§ 16[a] at 299-300 (1976 & 1989 Supp.).
82. Id. at 294-95 (1976 & 1989 Supp.). See also Clark & Smith, supra note 25, at~ 8.03[2],
text at nn:5o, 51 (1984 & 1988 Cum. Supp.)
83. 874 F.2d 653, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 617 (9th Cir. 1989).
84. The court also affirmed the breach of contract count. It concluded that the promise breached,
which was contained in a letter sent by the seller to the buyer, had not been superceded by the
buyer's later signing of the seller's form even though that form contained a merger clause.
85. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966).
86. 189 Ga. App. 473, 376 S.E.2d 390, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 384 (1989), cert.
denied, 189 Ga. App. 912 (1989).
87. Ga. Code Ann.§ 11-2-318 (1982).
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of a medical device used by Mrs. Carly's doctor in a voluntary sterilization
procedure performed upon Mrs. Cady. After the procedure, Mrs. Cady became
pregnant and this suit ensued. The trial court granted summary judgment for
the manufacturer on the warranty claim. On appeal, the court affirmed this
decision upon the ground that neither plaintiff had been in privity with the
manufacturer. The Georgia Supreme Court denied certiorari.BB
However, it is possible to evade privity limitations through the use of either
an assignment or agency principles. The Illinois Supreme Court decision,
Collins Co. v. Carboline Co.,B9 illustrates how an assignment of rights can be
used to avoid a lack of privily. In that case, the court held that a plaintiff who
was not within the class of those for whom the privity requirement had been
abolished could satisfy the privity requirement by taking an assignment of rights
from one who was in privity. There, the owners of a warehouse (Chicago Title
and Wachovia) had a contractor install a new roofing system manufactured by
Carboline. The manufacturer issued a written 10-year warranty to the owners.
Some three years later, Collins purchased the warehouse. Two years after this
purchase, the roof began to leak which limited Collins' use of the warehouse
and required repair of the roof. Collins took an assignment of the original
owners' warranty rights against the manufacturer. Collins then sued the manufacturer for economic loss in federal district court. 90 That court gave judgment
on the pleadings for the manufacturer. It ruled that Collins lacked privity and
that the assignment of warranty did not create privity. On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit found Illinois law to be uncertain on whether the assignment created
privity. 91 It certified this issue to the Illinois Supreme Court, which decided that
the assignment would place Collins in privity with the manufacturer. 92 The
supreme court left for the trial court to decide under U.C.C. subsection 2-210(2)
whether the assignment was effective. 93 Subsequently, based upon the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings. 94
Agency principles also can be used to evade privity requirements. If there is
just one party between the plaintiff and the manufacturer in the distribution
chain, and if it can be shown that the intervening party is the agent of the
88. See supra note 86.
89. 125 Ill. 2d 498, 532 N.E.2d 834, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 616 (1988).
90. Collins also sued the contractor who had installed the roof, as well as the architect whom
Collins had hired to inspect the warehouse prior to purchasing it and who had opined that the
roofing "looked in good shape." The claims against these parties were not in issue in the present
case.
91. Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 837 F.2d 299, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 273 (7th
Cir. 1988).
92. The opinion contains a useful collection and discussion of state and federal cases addressing
the issue of assignability of warranty rights, 125 Ill. 2d at 513-14, 532 N.E.2d at 840-41, 7 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 625-26.
93. U.C.C. § 2-210(2) permits assignment of all rights of seller or buyer unless either the parties
agreed otherwise or the assignment would have a material adverse effect upon the nonassigning
party.
94. 864 F.2d 560, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 629 (7th Cir. 1989).
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plaintiff or of the manufacturer, then the plaintiff is in privity with the
manufacturer. 95

PERFORMANCE
Title, Creditors, and Good Faith Purchasers
Creditors continue to ignore available protection against third party claims.
In In re BR/ Corp., 96 a creditor-consignor asserted priority to the proceeds from
the clothing it supplied to the debtor-consignee who subsequently filed for
bankruptcy. Under U.C.C. section 2-326(3), a consignor must prove one of
three things in order to protect its interest from the claims of consignee's
creditors: (i) that he complied with a "sign law"; 97 (ii) that the debtor was
"generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the
goods of others"; or (iii) that he made an article 9 filing. 98 Since there was no
sign law in Pennsylvania and the consignor had not made an article 9 filing,
consignor had to prove that subsection 2-326(3)(b) was satisfied in order to
protect his interests in the case.
Courts tend to strictly interpret the language of U.C.C. section 2-326(3)(b).
The factual test of proving that the buyer is "generally known by the buyer's
creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others" is almost
never met. 99 BR/ Corp. reinforces this trend. Despite proof that 250 of 600
suppliers of BRI Corp. supplied goods on a consignment basis, the court said
that this was not "most" of the suppliers. Moreover, the debtor had many
nonsupplier creditors, and there was no evidence that any of these knew that the ·
debtor generally sold goods on a consignment basis. Given the scant evidence on
which to base a decision that the buyer was "generally known" to sell on
consignment, the court's conclusion seems correct.
Although goods have never attained the status of full negotiability, the
predominance of ostensible ownership concerns has been the impetus behind a
gradual move toward a form of quasi-negotiability. Whether this halfway status
is presently deserved is unclear, its hold on the judicial psyche is not. A perfect
example is MBank-Waco, N.A. v. L. & }., Inc. 100 The dispute was over the
respective rights of MBank and the Mamot family to the proceeds from the sale
95. See, e.g., Costa v. Volkswagen of Am., 150 Vt. 213, 214 n.l, 551A.2d1196, 1197-98 n.1, 8
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 389, 391 n.1 (1988) (buyer in privily with manufacturer where
intervening dealer is agent of manufacturer); Irwin v. Lowe's, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 828, 302 S.E.2d
734, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 450 (1983) (buyer in privity with manufacturer if
intervening purchaser from manufacturer was acting as agent of buyer).
96. 88 Bankr. 71, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1441 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
97. Only North Carolina and Mississippi have such laws. See N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 66-72 (1975);
Miss. Code Ann.§ 15-3-7 (1972 & 1989 Cum. Supp.).
98. U.C.C. § 9-408 permits a creditor to make an article 9 filing without prejudicing its right to
assert that the transaction was a true consignment outside the transactional scope of article 9.
99. See, e.g., Logan Paving Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp., 172 Ga. App. 368, 323
S.E.2d 259, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 116 (1984); In re Hoover Co., 16 Bankr. 435, 33
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
100. 754 S.W.2d 245, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1476 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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of cattle ostensibly owned by Arnold Young, the "thief." Young and the
Mamots had "a-man's-word-is-his-bond" type of relationship. 101 The Mamots
supplied him with money to purchase cattle which he would fatten and sell with
the understanding that the Mamots would be paid back from the proceeds. The
cattle always bore Young's registered brand. 102 Unfortunately, as Young's
financial condition began to deteriorate so did his honesty. During the
1980-1981 cattle year, the Mamots were asked to pay for cattle that Young
never intended to buy. Some of this money was returned to the Mamots to cover
the previous year's obligations and the rest was used to finance all phases of
Young's cattle business. Also during this period, Young gave MBank a security
interest in "all cattle now owned or hereafter acquired." When his entire herd
was later sold by MBank, the Mamots claimed equitable ownership of the
proceeds under a constructive trust. 103 The trial court, emulating the wisdom of
Solomon, divided the proceeds equally between MBank and the Mamots.
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed. Without deciding whether the circumstances justified the imposition of a constructive trust, 1°' the court determined
that MBank was a good faith purchaser for value and as such would prevail
over an existing equitable title or interest. 105 Moreover, we are told that MBank
would also prevail under article 9. In the view of the court, the beneficiary of a
constructive trust is an unperfected lien creditor whose interest is subordinate to
that of a perfected secured party. 106 With respect to the position of the Mamots
that Young (a thief) could pass no interest in the cattle to MBank, the court

101. This characterization is the court's. Id. at 247, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at
1479. Surprisingly (considering that approximately $1.8 million was involved), no aspect of their
relationship was reduced to writing.
102. The Mamots knew this and admitted that their cattle was indistinguishable from the rest of
Young's cattle.
103. The Mamots argued that once they were able to trace their stolen funds to the purchase of
some cattle, the burden shifted to MBank to identify the cattle purchased with and without their
funds. Failing this, the Mamots laid claim to the entire herd. One could argue, however, that
U.C.C. § 9-315 places the burden of identification squarely on the shoulders of the Mamots. See
generally Frisch, U.C.C. Section 9-315: A Historical and Modern Perspective, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1
(1985).
104. For a discussion of the grounds for imposing a constructive trust, see generally G. Bogert,
The Law of Trust and Trustees 471 et seq. (Rev. 2d ed. 1978); 5 A. Scott, Trusts 461 et seq. (4th
ed. 1989).
105. The court was careful to point out that MBank, as a preexisting secured creditor, did not
qualify for protection under U.C.C. § 2-403(2) as a "buyer in ordinary course of business." MBank
was, however, a good-faith purchaser. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (" '[p]urchase' includes taking by ...
mortgage, pledge, lien."). As such, it "acquire[d] all title which [its] transferor had or had power to
transfer." U.C.C. § 2-403(1 ). In this case, the court relied on pre-Code rules to reach the conclusion
that Young had the "power" to transfer an interest, free of the alleged constructive trust.
106. The court cited U.C.C. § 9-201. See also U.C.C. § 9-301(1 )(b) ("[A Jn unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of ... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected.").
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decided that their conduct as a matter of law estopped them from disputing the
priority interest of MBank. 107
The twin assumptions on which the court's opinion rests are troubling, not
because they are necessarily wrong but because they are made with a blind faith
in their correctness. In the context of an existing constructive trust, it is by no
means certain whether a secured party who has not relied on the debtor's
ostensible ownership of property or who has not given value subsequent to the
trust coming into existence is entitled to the protection accorded historically to
good faith purchasers. 108 As far as the article 9 analysis is concerned, it might be
argued that resolution of this sort of priority dispute is outside its scope. 109
Cases continue to accumulate involving the extent to which non-Code law
governs the transfer of title to goods. Again this year, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has asserted the primacy of the Code. 110 In Alford v. Neal, 111 the court
held that, as between buyer and seller, noncompliance with the motor vehicle
certificate of title act does not prevent the transfer of title. The certificate is no
more than prima facie evidence of ownership. In another case, In re Bellanca
Aircraft Corp., 112 the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Code, not the Federal
Aviation Act, determined whether the transfer of an interest in a plane is valid
against creditors of the seller. Similarly, in Brink v. McNeil, 113 the Colorado
Court of Appeals decided that the state's livestock bill of sale laws did not affect
the U.C.C. mandated result.

107. That conduct consisted of entrusting Young with possession and allowing him to place his
brand on the cattle.
108. Although a dissenting voice is occasionally heard (see In re Emery Corp., 38 Bankr. 489, 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 834 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 52 Bankr. 944, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1172 (D.C. Pa. 1985)), it is now well settled that the secured creditor has purchaser
status when the competing claimant is a reclaiming seller (see infra notes 100-09 and accompanying
text) but different policy considerations may call for a more restrictive reading of the Code's
definition of purchaser when a constructive trust is at issue. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (definitions
applicable "unless the context otherwise requires").
109. In the first place, it seems that the court is confusing a constructive trust with the dissimilar
but functionally related (both serve to prevent unjust enrichment) equitable lien. Secondly, even if a
constructive trust can properly be viewed as generating a lien, it does not seem to be one of the type
to which the priority rule of U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) is directed. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) ("[A] 'lien
creditor' means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or
the like .... "). If not governed by a specific priority rule, can we say with confidence that the
drafters intended for this contest to be settled by the general priority rule of U.C.C. § 9-201?
110. See Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title,
44 Bus. Law. 1445, 1462-63 (1989).
111. 229 Neb. 67, 425 N.W.2d 325, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1457 (1988).
112. In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d 1275, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 656 (8th
Cir. 1988).
113. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1466 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
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Tender, Cure, and Notice of Breach
In Leitchfield Development Corp. v. Clark, 114 a Kentucky appel\ate court, for
the first time, had the opportunity to construe the relationship between U.C.C.
sections 2-601 and 2-508. The court held that the "perfect ten~er rule" set forth
in U.C.C. section 2-601 does not necessarily require a perfect t~nder in the first
instance. 115 If the seller properly exercises its right of cure, a rejection of a
nonconforming tender will not be permitted. In the case before it, the court
reversed a judgment for the buyers of a mobile home which was predicated on
an instruction to the jury that the buyers had the right to reject their home if it
failed to "conform to their purchase contract in any respect." The alleged
nonconformity was minor damage to one corner of the home which occurred
during its delivery and which could have been repaired for $75.
What makes Leitchfield a case worth reviewing is not so much what the court
decided but, rather, what it did not decide. Under U.C.C. section 2-508(1 ), cure
is allowed only if it can be accomplished within the "time for performance."
The majority opinion is silent on when the seller's performance was due.11 6 The
conclusion of Judge Wilhoit in a concurring opinion that in the absence of a
specified delivery date, the actual delivery date was the time for performance,
seems incorrect. It would be better to imply a reasonable delivery term under
U.C.C. section 2-309( 1 ). 117 Also missing from the decision is a recognition of the
divergence of opinion surrounding the application of subsection (2) of U.C.C.
section 2-508. 118 Must the seller show that it knew of the nonconformity at the
time of delivery, or is it sufficient to prove only that it believed the home would
be acceptable? 119 Finally, the court assumes that cure precludes an effective
rejection. As another case in this year's survey teaches, this is probably not
true. 12° Cure only makes the rejection wrongful. There is a difference.

114. 757 S.W.2d 207, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1092 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
115. By its terms, U.C.C. § 2-601 permits the buyer to reject "if the goods or the tender of
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract."
116. The court does include the issue of whether the intention to cure was communicated to the
buyers within the time allowed for performance as one of the questions of fact that may have to be
decided by the jury on remand. 757 S.W.2d at 212, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1099.
117. U.C.C. § 2-309(1) provides: "The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under
a contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time."
118. U.C.C. § 2-508(2) provides: "Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the
seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the
seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a
conforming tender."
119. Compare Meads v. Davis, 22 N.C. App. 479, 206 S.E.2d 868, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 40 ( 1974) ("Obviously this section deals with the situation in which the seller knows
prior to delivery that the goods are not in conformity ... .")with Joe Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 107 Misc. 2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 426 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1980) ("compelling equitable considerations exist to extend the§ 2-508(2) remedy to those
innocent sellers who have no prior predelivery knowledge of nonconformity").
120. See the discussion of Integrated Circuits Unlimited v. E.F. Johnson Co., 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 695 (2d. Cir. 1989), infra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.

U.C.C. Survey: General Provisions

2309

The Code requires that "[t]he buyer must within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered any breach, notify the seller of breach or be
barred from any remedy." 121 One recurring question is whether the need to give
notice extends to persons who are not "buyers" of the goods involved, but are
rather warranty beneficiaries. The answer continues to be in dispute. 122 In both
Carlson v. Armstrong World lndustries 123 and Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.,1 24 the courts determined that non-privity plaintiffs are not required to give
timely notice of breach. 125 In another case, Cooley v. Big Hom Harvestore
Systems, /nc., 126 the Colorado Court of Appeals followed the middle-of-the-road
position taken by that state's supreme court. 127 Recognizing that the need to give
notice might depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, the court of
appeals held that notice is necessary where the buyer is a commercial buyer and
the damage is to property. At the other end of the spectrum is Allen v. G.D.
Searle & Co. 128 The district court, applying Oregon law, ruled that even where
the plaintiff is a consumer who is seeking to recover for personal injuries, notice
must be given. 129
Another issue on which courts cannot agree concerns the sufficiency of notice
if given in a pleading. In Bednarski v. Hideout Homes & Realty, Inc., 130 the
court, anticipating how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide the
matter, could see no reason why a litigation filing, if timely made, could not
serve as adequate notification. On the other hand, the Allen 131 court on reconsideration, held that notice given for the first time in a complaint is insufficient
under Oregon law, as a matter of law. If the latter rule is accepted, exceptions
121. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (emphasis added).
122. The majority of courts hold that warranty beneficiaries need not give notice. See, e.g.,
Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1088 (Ala. 1979)
(notice not required); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 194 S.E.2d
513, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 737 (1972) (same); Mattos v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d
993, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 473 (1977) (same). But see Parillo v. Giroux Co., 426 A.2d
1313, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 108 (R.I. 1981) (notice is required). See also Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-607 Official Comment 5 ("the reason of the section does extend to requiring
the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred").
123. 693 F. Supp. 1073, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 751 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
124. 693 F. Supp. 1154, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 464 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
125. Their conclusion follows from taking U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a)'s use of the word "buyer"
literally. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a) ("'Buyer' means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods.").
126. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1051 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
127. The court of appeals cited Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1507 (Colo. 1980) (need to give notice might vary with the facts) and Palmer v. A.H.
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1150 (Colo. 1984) (consumer excused
from having to give notice).
128. 708 F. Supp. 1142, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 983 (D. Or. 1989).
129. The court relied on Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 512 P.2d 776, 13
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 10 (1973), as evidence that the pre-Code requirement of notice
remains an essential element of a warranty claim.
130. 709 F. Supp. 90, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1040 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
131. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1046 (D. Or. 1989). For an earlier decision in this
case, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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will invariably be required. For example, in Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco
Industries, 132 the court believed that a pleading can be an acceptable means of
notice in situations where the breach cannot reasonably be discovered until after
the commencement of litigation. 133
Finally, for those who have not yet learned to appreciate the importance of
U.C.C. section 2-607(3 )(a) (both to buyers, as a prerequisite to recovery, and to
sellers, as a basis for an affirmative defense), there is Fairhaven Textile Corp. v.
Sheehan, Phinney, Bass & Green, P.A. 134 Fairhaven involved a legal malpractice action against the law firm that had represented the seller in a previous
case. The district court held that the defendant firm's failure to raise the issue of
notice was malpractice as a matter of law. Query whether the court's holding
would be equally applicable to an attorney who fails to give notice on behalf of
the buyer?

Repudiation
Although U.C.C. section 2-609 was intended to free the aggrieved party from
having to make the oftentimes difficult decision whether the other party has
"repudiated" the contract, the section has as much potential to be a mine field as
it does a haven. 135 A case that makes this point very nicely is Scott v. Crown. 136
Buyer (Crown) and seller (Scott) entered into a series of contracts for the sale of
U.S. No. 1 wheat. Each contract provided for full payment by buyer 30 days
after complete performance by seller. Seller, after having performed the first
contract, but before payment was due, was told by his banker that buyer was
not the "best grain trader" and was informed by the Department of Agriculture
of a pending complaint against buyer concerning payments to other farmers. As
a consequence of this information and nonpayment by another buyer, seller told
buyer's driver, who had come for more wheat, that there would be no further
deliveries until contact was made with Mr. Crown "to settle some questions."
Buyer responded with two letters. In the first, he demanded performance; in the
second, he cancelled the contracts subject to reinstatement should seller resume
performance. Seller, through counsel, replied with a letter demanding assurances of performance, that is, early payment for all wheat that had previously
been delivered. When payment was not made, seller filed suit and the buyer
132. 686 F. Supp. 1319, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 429 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
133. In addition, the court stated two rules regarding notice; one for merchants, another for
retail consumers. Consumers can, even in the unexceptional case, give notice through litigation
filings. 686 F. Supp. at 1340, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 449.
134. 695 F. Supp. 71, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 780 (0. N.H. 1988).
135. To obtain a clear repudiation, a party who has "reasonable grounds for insecurity" may
"demand adequate assurance of due performance" under U.C.C. § 2-609(1 ). Subsection (4) of§ 2609 provides that "failure to provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such
assurance of due performance" is a "repudiation of the contract." But when does one have
reasonable grounds for insecurity and what assurances are adequate? These are only two of the
several new issues that the section creates.
136. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 464 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
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counterclaimed. The trial court gave judgment for seller on both its claim and
the counterclaim.
On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. Although it conceded
that reasonable grounds for seller's insecurity might have existed, the court
ruled that the timing, form, and content of the demand for assurances of
performance were fatally defective. First, the court addressed the adequacy of
the statement made to buyer's driver. Despite the fact that the Code mandates a
written demand for assurances, the court recognized the possibility that an oral
demand would suffice. 137 Such would be the case if, for example, it were clearly
understood that if assurances were not forthcoming there would be a suspension
of performance. Unfortunately for seller, the statement to the driver did not
unequivocally indicate what was required and the consequences of noncompliance. Nor did the later written demand justify a suspension of performance.
According to the court, the seller had no right to force a modification of the
contract by requesting payment before it was due. Therefore, it was seller who
repudiated and was in breach of the contracts.
The court's conclusion that a demand for assurances is ineffective if compliance would effect a modification of the contract is less than convincing. 138 It
seems that the very concept of assurances envisions the giving of something to
which the demanding party was not originally entitled. Also unclear is why a
requested assurance which is later deemed excessive should vitiate the demand
entirely. Perhaps the demanding party would be wise to leave the choice of
assurances to the other party, making only suggestions as to what would be
acceptable.

REMEDIES
Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance
Does the delivery of conforming goods to the buyer necessarily entitle the
seller to the purchase price? The Second Circuit Court of Appeals said it did
not in Integrated Circuits Unlimited v. E. F. Johnson Co. 139 Involved was the
purported rejection of 17 4 microprocessors which the district court found to be
in conformity with contract specifications. 14° Following their rejection, buyer
137. Id. at 468. Not all courts would agree. In fact, during this survey period two courts decided
otherwise. See Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., 686 F. Supp. 1319, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 429 (N.D. Ill. 1988); USX Corp. v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 753 S.W.2d 845,
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 100 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
138. A similar conclusion has surfaced in at least one other case. See, e.g., Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 931
(Callaghan) (7th Cir. 1976).
139. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 695 (2d Cir. 1989).
140. It is interesting to note that 1,973 microprocessors had been delivered and, except for 174,
all were found to be unacceptable although only 130 microprocessors were actually tested. This was
held to be statistically sufficient to justify a conclusion that the similar untested devices were also
defective. See generally Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Response to
Professor Kaye, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 78 (1987); Kay, Apples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients
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held the microprocessors in storage for three months, during which time the
seller refused to accept their return. 141 The Second Circuit found no error in the
trial court's conclusion that although buyer's rejection of the 17 4 units was
substantively wrongful, it was, nevertheless, procedurally effective. 142 The distinction is significant. If the goods have been effectively rejected, that precludes,
by negative implication, their acceptance under U.C.C. section 2-606(1 )(b). 143 If
there has been no acceptance, the seller is barred from recovering the contract
price under U.C.C. section 2-709. 144 Still, a wrongful rejection is a breach and
the buyer remains liable for damages. Unfortunately for the seller in Integrated
Circuits, it could establish none. Not having retaken possession of the goods, the
seller could not resell the goods and recover under U.C.C. section 2-706;
recovery under U.C.C. section 2-708( 1) was precluded because the contract and
market prices were, at all relevant times, the same; and loss volume seller status
could not be established which would entitle the seller to its lost profit under
U.C.C. section 2-708(2). The end result was a net credit and judgment in favor
of the buyer for $10,359 .145
Although the decision in Integrated Circuits appears to be consistent with the
language of the Code 146 and the intention of its drafters, 147 as a matter of policy,
its soundness is questionable. If the buyer has accepted the tender before seeking
to return the goods, their return can be refused by the seller and the buyer
remains liable for the price. 148 If the buyer has not accepted the goods, then their
and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 54 ( 1987); James, Relevancy, Probability and the
Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689 (1941).
141. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b) imposes on a buyer the duty to hold rejected goods, in which he does
not have a security interest, "with reasonable care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to
permit the seller to remove them." Because buyer had done all that it was required to do, the district
court held that any loss occasioned by a subsequent fall in the market price of microprocessors must
be borne by seller. The district court's opinion appears at 691 F. Supp. 630, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1478 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
142. An effective rejection refers to a rejection timely made and properly communicated to the
seller without regard to its justification.
143. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b) provides, in pertinent part:
( 1) Acceptance of the goods occurs when the buyer .... fails to make an effective rejection
(subsection (1) of§ 2-602 .... (emphasis added).
144. The statement in the text assumes that the goods have not been lost or damaged and that a
substitute disposition for a reasonable price is possible. See U.C.C. § 2-709.
145. The credit was the difference between the total contract price of all parts rejected by the
buyer ($171,084) and payments withheld on seller's account ($160,725). The judgment of the
district court in favor of the seller for $4638.73 was reversed because no credit was given for the
parts wrongfully, but effectively, rejected. As the Second Circuit correctly pointed out, to refuse a
credit "would be tantamount to awarding [seller] the price of the goods returned or of its lost profits
which, on these facts ... is unauthorized by the Code." 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 700.
146. See supra note 143.
147. See, e.g., Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199, 241 (1963).
148. It would seem from a reading of the Code that it is not possible to avoid liability for the
contract price by making procedurally effective but substantively wrongful revocation of acceptance.
See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 296-97 (3d ed. 1988).
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return cannot be refused by the seller. It is not clear that the seller's usual
ability to effect a more efficient disposition of the goods justifies making the
seller choose, at its risk, which course to pursue. 149
Andover Air Ltd. Partnership v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 150 considered several
issues involving the remedy of revocation. Andover Air Limited Partnership
("Andover") purchased a Piper Cheyenne 1A aircraft with a five-year warranty
from a Piper dealer. Approximately one year later, the plane was forced to
make a gear-up landing, necessitating substantial repairs. Andover sued Piper
Aircraft Corporation ("Piper"), the manufacturer of the plane, alleging that a
defective uplock hook assembly caused the accident.
The first issue concerned the right of Andover to seek both revocation and
damages for breach of warranty. Piper argued that to assert two mutually
exclusive remedies in a pleading is an act of bad faith and should not be
permitted. The court correctly rejected this contention. 151 Although the aggrieved party's freedom to choose its remedy is not unlimited, there is no reason
why the remedial flexibility inherent in article 2 should not be preserved, at
least through the pleading stage.
The next issue in Andover Air concerned the availability of revocation against
Piper, a non-privity manufacturer. The statutory impediment is the use of the
words "the seller" in U.C.C. section 2-608. The Code defines a seller as one
who "sells or contracts to sell goods," 152 and defines a "sale" as "the passing of
title from the seller to the buyer for a price." 153 As a consequence, most courts
have held that a buyer can revoke only against its immediate seller. 154 Apparently seeing no significance in the assumption of warranty liability by Piper, the
district court assumed that Massachusetts courts would agree with the majority
of cases. Hence, in the absence of a principal/agent relationship between the
manufacturer and dealer, 155 revocation is available only against the latter.
Another issue was whether Andover's use, repair, and maintenance of the
plane prior to the accident or its use of the plane following the accident
precluded revocation. The court stated that the questions of substantial change
149. As a practical matter, depending upon the buyer's solvency and other factors, the seller may
wish to retake possession of the goods regardless of its obligation to do so.
150. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494 (D. Mass. 1989).
151. In reaching its conclusion, the court cited rules ~(e)(2) & 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and several cases, including Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker
Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 80 (E.D. Mich. 1977) and General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anaya, 103 N.M. 72, 703 P.2d 169, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
824 (N.M. 1985).
152. u.c.c. § 2-103(1)(d).
153. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
154. See, e.g., Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208, 15 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 45 (6th Cir. 1974); Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638
P.2d 210, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1450 (Ariz. 1981); Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co.,
227 Va. 154, 313 S.E.2d 384, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 120 (1984).
155. Such a relationship was found and revocation was permitted against the manufacturer in
Costa v. Volkswagen of Am., 150 Vt. 213, 551A.2d1196, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 389
(1988).
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caused by preaccident use and the reasonableness of the postaccident use
presented questions of fact for resolution at trial. 156
U.C.C. section 2-608 permits revocation "of a lot or commercial unit." What
constitutes a "lot" 157 was before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in S& R
Metals, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (America). 158 In that case, C. Itoh contracted to
sell to S & R 5,500 metric tons of steel in coils of varying widths and thickness.
After having sold about 35% of the steel, S & R learned from a customer that the
14-gauge steel was defective. It then sought to revoke acceptance of the entire
amount of steel still in its possession, including gauges that were not shown to
be nonconforming. The district court permitted revocation and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. The circuit court refused to limit revocation to those "commercial units" that proved to be nonconforming, that is, the 14-gauge steel. The
court held that the provision pertaining to revocation of a lot does not depend
upon multiple deliveries. Where goods are delivered in a single lot, the right to
revoke extends to the entirety.
To conclude, one other case is worth mention. In Herbert v. Harl, 159 the
buyers sought to revoke their acceptance of a used automobile. What they did
not do was tender a properly executed reassignment of the certificate of
ownership that complied with the state's motor vehicle and licensing statutes. In
dicta, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that this rendered the attempted
revocation ineffective. 160 This seems wrong on two counts. First, U.C.C. section
2-401 ( 4) provides that title automatically revests in the seller upon revocation.
Second, a requirement that the buyer tender a completed certificate of ownership does not give recognition to the buyer's security interest under U.C.C.
section 2-711(3). This case is simply another example of the growing tension
between the Code and the plethora of commercial statutes external to the Code.

Reclamation
The cases continue to demonstrate the tenuous nature of the reclamation
rights of unpaid sellers. In particular, consider the frequent efforts of sellers to
156. Whether continued use of goods is at odds with revocation of acceptance will often depend
on the following factors:
[T]he seller's instructions to the buyer after revocation of acceptance; the degree of economic
and other hardship that the buyer would suffer if he discontinued using the good; the
reasonableness of continued use after revocation as a method for mitigating damages; the degree
of prejudice to the seller; and whether the seller acted in good faith.
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1501 (citing Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor
Co., 304 N.W.2d 654, 658, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 558, 563 (Minn. 1981)).
157. The term "lot" is defined as "a parcel or a single article which is the subject matter of a
separate sale or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the contract." U.C.C. § 2-105(5).
158. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 61 (9th Cir. 1988).
159. 757 S.W.2d 585, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 740 (Mo. 1988).
160. Id. at 590, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 746. The court failed to recognize that
revocation is not an ordinary course transfer of ownership. One suspects that the statutes were never
intended to govern transfers to involuntary transferees.
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reclaim, under U.C.C. section 2-702, goods that are subject to the interest of a
secured party (as a good faith purchaser) who financed the buyer's inventory.
Despite the fact that the vast majority of courts hold that the interest of the
unpaid seller is subordinate to the lien of the secured party, 161 sellers still do
battle, emboldened either by the factual nuances of their respective cases or the
cleverness of their arguments.
A somewhat different factual setting was involved in O'Brien v. Chandler. 162
What distinguished this case from most was the method of delivery and the
alleged terms of the agreement between the seller and buyer. Neither of those
matters prevented the New Mexico Supreme Court from affirming the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the secured party. The seller of
cattle delivered them to a feedlot for later delivery to the buyer. All the buyer
ever received were invoices which described the cattle and set out the sale price.
In his deposition, the seller testified that the buyer could, after inspection, reject
any or all of the cattle. 163 After the buyer inspected the cattle, but before
selecting those which he would keep, he used the cattle as collateral to secure a
loan from his bank.
The court started its analysis with the statement that "[t]he specific agreement between buyer and seller is simply not a material issue. What is material
is the fact that delivery was made by a seller to a buyer, and that fact is not in
dispute." 164 With that said, the case was cast in the mold of the familiar and so,
too, was most of the court's reasoning. It concluded that the buyer obtained
voidable title to the cattle with the consequent power to transfer good title
(security interest) to the bank, a bona fide purchaser without notice of the
seller's claim. 165 The court was also not persuaded by the seller's position that it
had a perfected article 2 security interest 166 under U.C.C. section 9-113 167
because of a state statute providing that possession of livestock without a
161. Although involving an attempt at reclamation by an unpaid cash seller under U.C.C. § 2507, In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 577 (5th Cir. 1975),
rev'd on reh'g en bane, 526 F.2d 1238, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 545 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), is generally considered the landmark case upholding the priority of the
secured creditor.
162. 107 N.M. 797, 765P.2d1165, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1450 (1988).
163. The seller also testified that notwithstanding the fact that the invoices set out the sale price,
it was expected that a price would be negotiated for any cattle which the buyer chose to keep.
164. Id. at 799, 765 P.2d at 1167, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1453. The court went
on to characterize the transaction as a "sale or return." Id. at 799, 765 P.2d at I 167, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1454. Once the court decided that a contract for sale existed, it is surprising
that it even considered parol evidence concerning the return aspect of the agreement. See U.C.C.
§ 2-326(4) ("Any 'or return' term of a contract for sale is to be treated as a separate contract for sale
within the statute of frauds section of this Article ... and as contradicting the sale aspect of the
contract within the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence .... ").
165. The seller also contended that it had successfully stopped delivery of the cattle under
U.C.C. § 2-705 before the buyer was notified by the feedlot that goods were being held for him.
There was, however, no evidence that any attempt was made to stop delivery before the security
interest was given to the bank.
166. Although the court never mentions the source of the alleged article 2 security interest, it
presumably would have arisen under U.C.C. § 2-401 ("Any retention or reservation by the seller of
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document of title is prima facie evidence that possession is unlawful. 168 Even if a
perfected article 2 security interest existed, the seller could not reclaim after the
expiration of the 10-day period provided by U.C.C. section 2-702:
Perhaps the seller would have met with more success had he not characterized himself as a "seller." Could he not have argued that, prior to the buyer's
selection of cattle there was no contract of sale, but rather an offer to sell cattle
then bailed with the feedlot? The case also serves as a reminder of how poorly
U.C.C. section 9-113 works to bridge the gap between articles 2 and 9. 169
In Estate of Schomer v. Piggot, 170 the seller attempted to use an equal
protection challenge to the secured party's priority. Seller argued that equal
protection of the laws was denied because the Code gives sophisticated and
experienced bankers an unfair advantage over less sophisticated and experienced farmers. The Iowa Supreme Court quite properly rejected this attempt to
make the operation of the Code's rules vary with the relative business savvy of
the parties.
·

Buyer's Money Remedies and Their Limitations
The basic statutory formula of U.C.C. section 2-714(2) is simple: "[t]he
measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount." Reflection on a trio of recent
cases involving this subsection reveals that its application is oftentimes not so
simple.
In the first case, Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc., 171 Nelson sued for breach
of an implied warranty of merchantability on a used car. The jury awarded
Nelson $3500. The trial judge set aside the verdict for lack of sufficient evidence
on damages. 172 On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed. The court found no merit in Nelson's contention that the jury could
infer that the car was essentially worthless 173 on the basis of his testimony that

the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a
security interest.").
167. U.C.C. § 9-113 provides that an article 2 security interest is perfected "so long as the
debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods."
168. See N.M.S.A. §§ 77-9-21 and 77-9-22 (1978).
169. See generally Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution
of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 Yale L.J. 907
(1978).
170. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 513 (Iowa 1989).
171. 370 S.E.2d 734, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 116 (W. Va. 1988).
172. One can readily see what motivated the trial judge to set aside the verdict. The jury's award
gave Nelson the purchase price and let him keep the car.
173. In this regard the supreme court's opinion is inconsistent. At the outset we are told that the
jury returned a verdict in the amount of $3500. Id. at 735, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at
116. Later in the opinion, the court refers to a $3400 award which presumably was based on a
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he did not drive the car due to its condition. 174 The trial judge erroneously failed
to admit repair bills in the amount of $455.04. The appellate court made the
point that if the contract price represents value that a good should have had, the
contract price less repair costs may be the actual value of the good accepted. 115
Thus, no special circumstances are needed for justifying the admissibility of
repair costs. 176
In the second case, Crook Motor Co. v. Goolsby, 177 the district court was faced
with a claim for damages for breach of the warranty of title and fraud. ]. W.
Goolsby sold a truck tractor to Crook Motor Co. for $48,000. Crook Motor sold
the tractor to Battle Creek Ford for $54,000. Battle Creek sold to another
person for more than $69,000. Events established that the vehicle had been
stolen before the sale to Crook Motor. Crook Motor was obliged to refund the
purchase price to Battle Creek. Crook Motor then sued Goolsby and all others
in the chain of preceding sales for breach of warranty of good title under U.C.C.
section 2-312( 1) and fraud.
Against both Goolsby and Buddy Simmons (the initial seller of the truck), the
court awarded damages of $54,000. Goolsby's liability under U.C.C. section 2714(2) was assumed to be the $48,000 purchase price. Since Crook Motor never
received good title, the actual value was zero and the court assumed the truck's
value would have been $48,000, which was the purchase price. The remainder
of the award consisted of incidental and consequential damages under U.C.C.
section 2-715.17 8 The court computed Simmons's liability differently. The court
purported to assess damages using a "benefit of the bargain" formula. 179
Although the tractor on resale had eventually brought $69,793, the court
finding that the car, when delivered, was worth $100. Id. at 736 n.4, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) at 118 n.4.
174. Although admissible on the issue of value, the testimony of Nelson, standing alone, was
held insufficient to establish the value of the vehicle.
175. Obviously this may not always be true. The value goods would have had may be more or
less than the contract price. The actual diminished value of goods may not, in some cases, be
captured by repair costs. Nonetheless, repair costs are certainly relevant and with proper foundation
should be admitted in a damage case built on U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
176. The trial court apparently believed that the admissibility of repair bills depended upon a
showing of "special circumstances." The supreme court correctly recognized that a showing of
special circumstances is necessary only if one is attempting to show that the entire formula of
U.C.C. § 2-714(2) is inappropriate.
177. 703 F. Supp. 511, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 363 (N.0. Miss. 1988).
178. Because Goolsby knew he was selling to a used truck dealer he was liable to Crook Motor
for its out-of-pocket expenses in preparing the truck for resale ($450.57) and the lost profit on the
resale to Battle Creek ($5,549.43). Crook Motor's claim for damages for loss of good will and
business reputation was held to be too speculative to be allowed.
179. Buddy Simmons was held liable on a non-Code misrepresentation theory. Crook Motor
could not recover for breach of the warranty of title since that warranty was held to protect only the
immediate purchaser and not run with the goods. U.C.C. § 2-721, however, states that "[r]emedies
for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available under this Article for nonfraudulent breach." Although no mention was made of U.C.C. § 2-714(2), it seems reasonable to
assume that because of the stated equivalency between fraud and contract remedies, it was the
governing section. It should also be mentioned that, in addition to the general damages award of
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refused to use that figure as a benchmark. Rather, it used the price of $54,000
for which Crook Motor sold to Battle Creek as an upper limit on recovery.
According to the court, anything else would have been a windfall.
The decision in Crook Motor is of interest insofar as it forces a rethinking of a
basic remedial policy issue. To what extent should the actual loss established by
events subsequent to the breach cap or mandate the application of a particular
measure of damages? 180 If it is a correct inference that the value of the tractor at
the time and place of acceptance (assuming good title) exceeded the $54,000 sale
price, then the higher value rather than the purchase price should have been the
benchmark for damage calculations under section 2-714(2). Yet, later events
showed that an award based on this figure would have yielded more than the
buyer would have obtained by the seller's full performance. Whether the court's
adjustment of the damage formula of section 2-714(2) under these circumstances
is good policy is a question far too complex for adequate treatment in the
context of this survey. 181 It suffices to say that an award which appears
overcompensatory may not be once the costs of litigation (both those that are
measurable but not legally recoverable and those that are immeasurable) are
taken into account.
The third case, Costa v. Volkswagen of America, 182 highlights the judicial
system's inadequacies all too clearly. Costa bought an Audi 5000 in 1979 for
$11,530. During the next several months he noticed many problems. After
unsuccessful repair attempts, Costa revoked acceptance. He then commenced
this suit for breach of express warranty. The jury awarded Costa $13,000, and
on the verdict form wrote: "The Jury's verdict for plaintiff is with the stipulation that the title to the 1979 Audi 5000 be awarded to Volkswagen of America,
Inc." The trial judge granted a new trial in the belief that the jury wrongly
based its award upon a theory of rescission. The case was retried to the court
and this time a judgment for the defendant was entered.
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court determined that there should have
been no new trial on the issue of liability. The jury had been correctly instructed
on the requirements for an effective revocation and the mandate on the verdict
form was consistent with that remedy. The trial court had compounded its error
by instructing the jury that damages after revocation were to be calculated using
the formula of section 2-714(2). 183 This is obviously wrong. That formula
$54,000, Simmons was found liable for punitive damages of $80,000 and a reasonable attorney's fee
yet to be assessed.
180. For a sampling of some of the many different fact patterns involving this problem, see J.
White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 243-265 (3d ed. 1988).
181. This subject was one of the topics discussed at the meeting of the subcommittee on General
Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title in Houston, Texas (Spring 1989).
182. 150 Vt. 213, 551 A.2d 1196, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 389 (1988).
183. Where the buyer "rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance" general damages are
recoverable under U.C.C. § 2-712 (cover) or U.C.C. § 2-713 (market price/contract price differential). U.C.C. §§ 2-71 l(l)(a) & (b). Another case where the court failed to fully understand the
remedial scheme of article 2 is Andover Air Ltd. Partnership v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494 (D. Mass. 1989) (mistaken assumption that revocation does not permit
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applies only if the buyer retains the goods. Thus, a third trial was necessitated
on the issue of damages.
The case shows a plaintiff heading toward trial for a third time after eight
years of litigation. The root of the problem was the trial judge's lack of
appreciation for the distinction among remedies allowed under article 2. In
particular, the judge instructed the jury on section 2-714(2) when it was
inapplicable.
Protracted litigation was also a fate faced by the buyers in Nachazel v.
Miraco Manufacturing. 184 The case arose from the purchase of hog farrowing
houses and nurseries known as Mirahuts. The buyers alleged and the jury
found that the plaintiff stopped using the huts after two years because they were
worthless. The jury awarded damages under U.C.C. section 2-714(2) for the
decrease in value, and under U.C.C. section 2-715 for lost profits. Additionally,
the trial court allowed the jury to consider, as items of consequential damages,
interest on a purchase price loan and the cost of installing the defective huts.
The court of appeals disagreed. It held that since the warranty was breached
after the interest and installation expenses were incurred, the requisite causal
connection between the breach and the loss was lacking.
However, the Iowa Supreme Court thought differently. 185 Turning first to the
issue of interest, the court drew a distinction between a buyer who retains the
goods and one who revokes acceptance or rejects the goods. 186 With respect to the
former, the court determined that as a matter of policy (what policy we are
never told) interest is not recoverable. 187 Why not, however, permit the buyer to
recover interest on that portion of the purchase price which is effectively rebated
in the form of diminished value damages under section 2-714(2)? 188 To the
court's credit, this is seen as an option. To its discredit, it is rejected as too
difficult to ascertain. 189 Turning next to the cost of installation, the court held
that it may be recovered provided the seller was credited with whatever value or
benefit the buyer received.
A final observation: rather than remand for an inevitable second trial, buyers
were given the opportunity to file a remittitur in an amount equal to the interest
recovery of benefit of the bargain damages). For more on this case see supra notes 150-56 and
accompanying text.
184. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 469 (Iowa 1988).
185. Regardless of the type of consequentials involved, there must be a showing that the seller at
the time of contracting had reason to know of the possible loss. U.C.C. § 2-715{2)(a). Although the
jury was never instructed on this requirement, the point was not raised on appeal.
186. The seller argued that no expense could be recovered if it would have been incurred in spite
of the breach. If this narrow view of consequentials had been accepted by the court, the distinction
drawn would have been unnecessary.
187. What policy considerations mandate that interest should be recoverable when the goods are
returned to the seller is equally unclear. The opinion is helpful in that it does contain quite a
number of citations to cases on both sides of the issue.
188. A portion or the interest expense will be returned to the buyer in the guise or statutory
prejudgment interest which, in Iowa, accrues from the date of the commencement of the action.
Iowa Code § 535.3 ( 1987).
189. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 477.
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cost and one-half the installation cost. The court's ultimate disposition of the
appeal reflects a refreshing pragmatism that should serve as a lesson to others.
Schmaltz v. Nissen 190 involved a sale of corn seed where there were disclaimers of warranties and limitations on damages. The buyer argued unconscionability under U.C.C. sections 2-302(2) and 2-719, because he was left with the
dismally inadequate remedy of return of the purchase price when the defective
seed did not produce a crop. A similar case was decided in favor of the buyerfarmer in South Dakota in 1985 191 but was overruled by statute in 1986. 192
However, in Schmaltz, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the 1986
legislation should not be applied retroactively since the cause of action arose in
1981. The 1986 legislation did not specifically provide that it was to apply
retroactively, so the court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding the
disclaimer of warranties and limitation of damages unconscionable.
The court analyzed the situation as one of unequal bargaining power, and
found that the buyer-farmers were not in a position to bargain for more
favorable terms. 193 At a loss for a remedy in a case that presented a sympathetic
buyer, the court found unconscionability even in the face of contrary legislative
intent. The court's opinion, read with the two concurring opinions, seems to
suggest that warranty exclusions on seed are unconscionable virtually as a
matter of law .194 Presumably this attitude by the court is what gave rise to the
express legislative abrogation in 1986.
Envirotech Corp. v. Halco Engineering, lnc. 195 reexamines the much-debated
question of what happens when a contract contains both a "limited remedy"
provision and an exclusion of consequential damages, and the limited remedy
fails in its essential purpose. The Virginia Supreme Court sided with those
courts which have respected consequential damage exclusions even where Jim-

190. 431 N.W.2d 657, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1061 (S.D. 1988).
191. See Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'I, 373 N.W.2d 30, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1244 (S.D. 1985).
192. The new law provides: "The ruling in ... Hanson v. Funk Seeds International ... is
hereby abrogated." 1986 S.D. Laws 410.
193. In two other cases decided during this survey period buyer-farmers did not fare as well. See
Peacock v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 688 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (exclusion
of consequentials in the directions for use of herbicide was not unconscionable); Earl Brace & Sons
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 708 F. Supp. 708, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 690 (W.D. Pa. 1989)
(same).
194. The concurring opinion of Justice Sabers, for example, attacks the crafty ways in which the
packaging industry tries to bypass the U.C.C. requirement of conspicuousness in warranty disclaimers. It is suggested that a possible method for making these disclaimers conscionable and giving the
buyer a real choice is to sell a product with a warranty for x amount, and to sell the same product
without a warranty for the same amount less the value of the warranty. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) at 1073.
195. 234 Va. 583, 364 S.E.2d 215, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494 (1988).
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ited remedies have failed. 196 The court held that it should not "rewrite the
agreement" 197 of the parties.

Seller's Money Remedies
North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. Direct Mail Specialist 198 considered a seller's right to recover prejudgment interest on the unpaid portion of the
contract price as incidental damages. 199 North American Foreign Trading Corp.
("NAFTC") entered into an agreement to sell 164,968 units of a blackjack
game to Direct Mail Specialist ("DMS"). DMS gave NAFTC a $100,000
deposit to be applied only to the last shipment. DMS repudiated the contract
after NAFTC had delivered only 60,000 units. NAFTC commenced this action
shortly thereafter, in late 1983. According to NAFTC, its attempts to resell the
undelivered units were largely unavailing until mid-1986 when a single purchaser began buying the units at a price below the original price. Before the
district court was NAFTC's motion for a determination of the proper method of
calculating the amount of prejudgment interest to which it would be entitled
should it prevail.
The court had two methods to choose from. NAFTC urged that interest was
recoverable on the full contract price until the resale in mid-1986 and thereafter
on the difference between the contract price and the resale price. DMS, on the
other hand, took the position that interest was permitted on the net amount of
damages only, that is, the contract price less the amount received upon resale. 200
The court agreed with NAFTC. 201 Relying on the language of U.C.C. section

196. This survey period saw the division or authority grow even greater. Compare Fidelity &
Deposit Co. or Maryland v. Krebs Engineers, 859 F.2d 501, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 89
(7th Cir. 1988) (exclusion or consequentials held to be invalid) and Andover Air Ltd. Partnership v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1494 (D. Mass. 1989) (withdrawn as a
result or settlement) with Employers Ins. v. Suwanee River SPA Lines, Inc., 866 F.2d 752, 8
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 659 (5th Cir. 1989) (exclusion or consequentials remains valid).
See generally Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purpose to an Exclusion of
Consequential Damages: An Objective Approach, 25 Duq. L. Rev. 551 (1987) and Mather,
Consequential Damages When Exclusive Repair Remedies Fail: Uniform Commercial Code Section
2-719, 38 S.C.L. Rev. 673 (1987).
197. 234 Va. at 593, 364 S.E.2d at 220, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1502.
198. 697 F. Supp. 163, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
199. Authorization for the seller's recovery or incidental damages is found in U.C.C. § 2-710.
200. H the three-year delay was reasonable, the measure or NAFTC's recovery would be the
difference between the resale price and the contract price under U.C.C. § 2-706. DMS argued that
the applicable New York statute restricted any computation or interest to this amount. See N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Law§ 5001(a) (McKinney 1963) ("Interest shall be recovered upon a sum awarded because
or a breach or performance or a contract. ... ").
201. The court finessed its way around the limiting New York statute by juggling labels. Rather
than label the time value or money loss as statutory damages, it considered it "incidental" damages
recoverable under the Code without regard to any external statute. The court did, however, view the
statute as setting the appropriate rate or interest.
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2-709, 202 it held that interest could be recovered on the contract price (less the
$100,000 deposit) "from the date of breach until the time at which the seller
could reasonably have resold the goods with reasonable effort for a reasonable
price. " 203
Despite its inconsistency with the language of New York's prejudgment
interest statute, the decision makes good sense. If a remedy is to substitute for
performance, 204 the seller's actual ability to resell must be considered. The
assumption underlying U.C.C. sections 2-706 and 2-708 is that a ready market
for the goods exists. Thus, the buyer should have to pay interest on only that
portion of the original contract price which cannot be recaptured from the
marketplace. Where this assumption proves incorrect, the Code makes the buyer
responsible for the contract price and liability for delay damages for the buyer's
nonpayment should follow. This is true even if the buyer's principal obligation
is subsequently modified because of a later resale. To hold otherwise would
have the untoward effect of reducing the seller's overall recovery if the invitation
to resell under U.C.C. section 2-709(2) is accepted. 205
On rare occasion, a case will come to trial before the time for the seller's
tender of the goods. If the market price of the goods is needed to calculate the
seller's damages, U.C.C. section 2-723( 1) directs that the relevant date for its
determination is "the time when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation." This provision was considered in Manchester Pipeline Corp. v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co. 206
Peoples Gas allegedly contracted with Manchester to purchase natural gas.
The contract was to run for a period of 10 years and contained several
provisions which are commonly found in long-term gas purchase contracts and
which impact on the price during its term. 207 Soon after negotiations had been
completed, Peoples Gas perceived a "softening" of the market, denied the
contract's existence, and refused to buy. Manchester then attempted to mitigate
its damages by entering into a one-year "spot market" contract with a third
party. 208 The trial court instructed the jury that it was to determine the seller's
damages based on the difference between the market price at the time and place
Peoples Gas would have taken delivery of the gas and the agreed price.
202. According to U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b), the seller may recover the full contract price if it "is
unable after reasonable effort to resell [the goods] at a reasonable price or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort would be unavailing."
203. 697 F. Supp. at 167, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1060.
204. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed .... ").
205. The seller would lose the difference between the amount of interest computed on the full
contract price and the amount computed on the contract price/resale price differential for the period
during which it was unable to effectuate a reasonable resale.
206. 862 F.2d 1439, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1000 (10th Cir. 1989).
207. One such provision was the so-called "market-down" or "market-out" provision which
permits the buyer to reduce the price for gas taken in order to remain competitive in the gas market.
208. A spot market contract has a term from one month to one year, and provides the seller with
a lower price than it would get under a long-term contract.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court's reliance on the
Official Comment to U.C.C. section 2-723 to justify a departure from its
mandate was misplaced. 209 Market price should be determined at the time
Manchester learned of the repudiation. 210 Still to be decided was the controlling
market. At trial, the parties seemed to assume that damages should be decided
by reference to the spot market price under a spot market contract. Not so said
the Tenth Circuit. The comparison should be with the higher market price of
gas under a similar long-term contract. 211 One wonders whether the decision
would have been the same if the higher price was obtainable by a dissimilar spot
market sale.

Statutes of Limitations
This year, the courts continued to misinterpret and misapply the "future
performance" warranty provision of U.C.C. section 2-725(2). 212 Lining up
behind the other jurisdictions, the Alabama Supreme Court, in a case of first
impression, held that a repair and replacement new car warranty does not
explicitly extend to the future performance of the car.
In Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile BMC Truck, lnc., 213 the plaintiff had
purchased an Oldsmobile covered by General Motor's 12 month/12,000 mile
"1981 New Car Warranty." 214 The warranty provided that the dealer, Steel
City, would repair and adjust defects within the agreed-upon period. The car
turned out to have numerous defects which were never successfully repaired.

209. The Comment instructs that "[t]his section is not intended to exclude the use of any other
reasonable method of determining market price or of measuring damages if the circumstances of the
case make this necessary." Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-723 Official Comment. The district court
pointed to the uniqueness of gas purchase agreements and the volatility of the gas market as reasons
for allowing the jury to speculate on future market conditions.
210. In the court's opinion, the rule of U.C.C. § 2-723 has "the virtue of certainty." 862 F.2d at
1447, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1012.
211. The only rationale given was that long-term contracts are more predictable. The court
summarily rejected the contrary position taken by at least one scholar who argues that the
controlling comparison price should be the spot price. Id. at 1448 n.12. 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) at 1013 n.12 (citing Jackson, "Anticipatory Repudiation" and the Temporal Element
of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry into Contract Damages in Cases of Prospective Nonperformance, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1978)).
212. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) provides:
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except
that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of
the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the
breach is or should have been discovered.
213. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 701 (Ala. 1989).
214. Tittle also purchased additional protection from his lender, General Motors Acceptance
Corporation ("GMAC"), in the form of a supplemental warranty for 36 months or 36,000 miles.

2324 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 45, August 1990
Eventually, Tittle sued for breach of warranty, 215 and the trial court granted the
defendants' motion for a summary judgment216 based upon the statute of
limitations defense. The Alabama Supreme Court framed the U.C.C. section
2-725(2) issues on appeal as: did the repair warranty explicitly extend to the
car's future performance?; and, if not, did a breach of the repair warranty occur
upon tender of the car or upon failure to subsequently repair the defects?
After reviewing the case law from other jurisdictions, the court adopted the
majority view that such warranties do not guarantee the future performance of
the car. 217 If anything, they imply "that the goods may fall into disrepair or
otherwise malfunction. No warranty that the goods will not, is to be inferred
from the warranty to make needed repairs." 218 Since the warranty did not
extend to the car's future performance, that exception to the time of tender rule
was inapplicable. As to the issue of whether the statute began to run upon
tender or when the promise to repair was breached, the court found the answer
in the subsection's "plain meaning." 219 The repair or replace clause is a
warranty, but it does not explicitly extend to the future performance of the good.
Therefore, it must run from the time of tender.
In Crouch v. General Electric Co., 220 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, applying Mississippi law, held that neither of
the two express warranties covering a helicopter engine explicitly extended to
future peformance. Again, since the statute of limitations began to run upon
tender of the helicopters, the plaintiff's six-year-old personal injury claim was
time-barred. The Crouch court relied upon many of the same cases cited in
Tittle to reach the same conclusion that a "maximum term of liability of

215. The defendants were Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., General Motors Corporation ("GM"), and GMAC. Query whether U.C.C. § 2-725 is even applicable where the warranty
is given by someone other than the seller?
216. Only Steel City and GM filed motions; Tittle's case remained pending against GMAC.
217. See, e.g., Ontario Hydro v. Zallea Sys., 569 F. Supp. 1261, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1222 (D. Del. 1983); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371, 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 954 (1976); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 354
N.Y.S.2d 778, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d
866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 699 (1975); Carabello v. Crown
Controls Corp., 659 F. Supp. 839, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 101 (D. Colo. 1987); New
England Power Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 20 Mass. App. 25, 477 N.E.2d 1054, 40 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1735 (1985).
But see Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawsen Co., 587 F.2d 813, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 65 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979) (repair or replace warranty
which extends a specific period of time explicitly warrants future performance so that the cause of
action accrues when the buyer discovered or should have discovered the defect within the warranty
period).
218. 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 709.
219. Id. at 712.
220. 699 F. Supp. 585, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1113 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
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warranty" provision 221 is a repair and replace warranty, and the maximum term
simply indicates the time the buyer has to exercise his remedy. 222
The Tittle and Crouch courts (as have others) failed to realize that the
promise to repair or replace, if it is any one thing, is actually a remedy, not a
warranty. 223 Yet it makes no sense to speak of a remedy without a breach. 224
Perhaps the obligation is simply another way of saying the goods will function
properly for the term of the repair or replace warranty. In other words,
underlying the remedy is a warranty of future performance. 225
The holding of Tittle on when the statute of limitations begins to run is
contrary to common sense. Imagine an optimistic car buyer with a 5 year/
60,000 mile warranty. If the statute begins to run from the time of tender, the
buyer cannot sue on the contract even though he still has one year of protection
remaining. There is no compelling policy reason for this result.
In Hanscome v. Perry, 226 the appellant, an interior decorator, sued the
manufacturer and wholesaler for negligence after a damaged console was
delivered to her customer. The action was dismissed by the trial court as timebarred by the three-year tort statute of limitations. She filed a second suit for
breach of contract, and express and implied warranties. That too was dismissed;
by then four years had passed since the delivery of the console.

221. The warranty in Crouch read as follows: "The warranty on each of the ... 170 ... engines
shall cease three (3) years from the date the Government accepts the first engine .... " In the event of
a defect, GE is only required to repair or replace the part. Id. at 593-94, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) at 1121.
222. The plaintiff's implied warranty claim was dismissed in a footnote; an implied warranty
obviously cannot explicitly refer to future performance of the good. Id. at 593 n.8, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1121 n.8.
Courts and commentators agree that implied warranties cannot explicitly extend to the future
performance of the good as a matter of law. However, under pre-Code law prospective, implied
warranties could extend to the future performance of the goods. The statute of limitations did not
begin to run until there was knowledge of the breach. Comment, The Sales Statute of limitations in
the Uniform Commercial Code-Does it Preclude Prospective Implied Warranties? 37 Fordham L.
Rev. 247, 250 (1968).
223. Under U.C.C. § 2-313(1 )(a), "[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise." The promise to repair or
replace relates to the seller's undertaking, not to the condition of the goods.
224. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully
performed .... ")(emphasis added).
225. According to White and Summers, "many courts would interpret this [discussing a typical
new car warranty J as a warranty that explicitly extends to future performance and would therefore
grant four years from the time of the occurrence of the defect." 1 J. White & R. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code, 553 (3d ed. 1988). Yet in an earlier discussion it is suggested such warranties do
not explicitly extend to the future since "all warranties in a sense apply to the future performance of
goods." Id. at 551. The exception would swallow the rule.
226. 75 Md. App. 605, 542 A.2d 421, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) (1988).
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On appeal, the decorator relied on the earlier tort filing to invoke the tolling
provision of U.C.C. section 2-725(3). 227 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal. In order to meet the exception, the first action must
have been "for the same breach," that is, another contract claim. By its own
terms, the section can only apply to actions for breach of contract or warranty.
U.C.C. section 2-725 has no bearing on tort and other unrelated claims.
Two final cases bear witness to the fact that not all exceptions are easily
found within the four corners of the statute. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that U.C.C. section 2-725 does not apply to arbitration proceedings.228 The court relied on the definition of "action" 229 to find that it covers only
judicial proceedings, and distinguished arbitration as an out-of-court proceeding.230 Lastly, the Seventh Circuit held that a five-year-old counterclaim was not
barred by U.C.C. section 2-725(1), given that a specific statutory exception to
that provision existed under Illinois law. 231

ARTICLE SEVEN (DOCUMENTS OF TITLE)
U.C.C. section 7-209(1) gives the warehouseman a lien on bailed goods
"covered by a warehouse receipt." Section 7-202(2) lists the terms that must
appear in a warehouse receipt. Suppose a warehouseman issues a receipt that
does not contain all of the required terms. Does that mean that the warehouseman has no lien on the bailed goods under section 7-209? Under these
circumstances the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division upheld the
warehouseman's lien in Evergreen International Services Corp. v. Wallant
International Trade, /nc. 232 In that case, the bailor entered into an arrangement
with the warehouseman under which inventory was stored in the warehouse,
removed from time to time, and replaced with additional inventory. The
warehouseman issued invoices for each delivery to the warehouse. Eventually,
the bailor refused to pay storage charges claiming that some of its inventory was
missing from the warehouse. In the ensuing litigation, the bailor argued that the
227. U.C.C. § 2-725(3) provides: "[W]here an action commenced within the time limited by
subsection ( 1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach
such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months
after the termination of the first action .... "
228. Cameron v. Griffith, 90 N.C. App. 164, 370 S.E.2d 704, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 486 (1988). This holding may be dicta since the majority opines that an arbitrator's
decision is not reviewable by a court of law. Id. at 165, 370 S.E.2d at 705, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) at 487.
229. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) and U.C.C. § 1-201(1).
230. Query whether this result is correct when U.C.C. § 1-201(1) includes "any other proceedings in which rights are determined"?
231. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 399 (7th Cir. 1988).
The Illinois Statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 13-207 (1987) provided that the defendant's
counterclaim was not time-barred as long as the plaintiff's claim arose before the cause of action
brought as counterclaim was barred.
232. 288 N.J. Super. 477, 550 A.2d 175, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1603 (1988).
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warehouseman did not have a lien on the goods remaining in the warehouse
because the invoices did not contain all of the terms required to be in a
warehouse receipt. The trial court held that the warehouseman had a lien. On
appeal, the court affirmed. It held that the invoices need only identify the bailor
and warehouseman, and describe the goods and their location, 233 which these
invoices did. The sanction for omitting required terms was only that specified in
subsection 7-202(2): liability "for damages caused by the omission to a person
injured thereby."
Under article 7, the duty of care owed by carriers and warehousemen toward
goods in their possession is essentially the same: they must exercise the same
degree of care as a reasonably careful man would exercise under like circumstances. 234 However, article 7 does not displace any state law rule that imposes a
higher duty of care. 235 Some states hold either carrier or warehouseman or both
to higher standards of care. 236 Consequently, it is possible that in a given state
the standards of care for carriers and warehousemen will not be the same. This
circumstance creates a problem where a bailee of goods is transporting and
storing the goods at different times. If the goods are lost, destroyed, or damaged
while in its possession, is the bailee liable as a carrier or as a warehouseman?
The Nebraska Supreme Court discussed this issue in Fisher Corp. v. Consolidated Freightways, /nc. 237 Under Nebraska law, a carrier is liable for any losses
to the goods with certain exceptions not applicable in this case. A warehouseman, however, is liable only for losses caused by his negligence. In this case,
Consolidated Freightways ("Consolidated") received a quantity of VCRs for
interstate shipment to the buyer. Upon arrival, the buyer rejected the goods
because they duplicated earlier deliveries. Consolidated returned the goods to its
terminal for storage until it received instructions from the seller. Some time
later, the seller requested that the goods be shipped back to it. During the time
the goods were stored at Consolidated's terminal, unknown persons stole some
of the goods. It could not be ascertained whether the theft had occurred before or
after Consolidated received the seller's instructions to reship. The trial court left
it to the jury to decide whether Consolidated was liable as a carrier or
233. This holding was based upon a New Jersey case decided under the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act, which was superceded by U.C.C. Article 7. See N.J. Title Guar. & Trust Co. v.
Rector, 75 A 931, 76 N.J. Eq. 587 (1910).
234. U.C.C. § 7-204(1) (warehouseman's duty of care); U.C.C. § 7-309(1) (carrier's duty of
care).
235. U.C.C. § 7-204(4) and Official Comment; U.C.C. § 7-309(1) and Official Comment.
236. In many states, the carrier is an insurer of the safety of the goods except for acts of God or
public enemies, fault of the shipper, inherent defect, or causes excepted by contract. R. Riegert &
R. Braucher, Documents of Title 39 (3d ed. 1978). These state rules apply to intrastate shipments
of goods. 1 S. Sorkin, Goods in Transit§ 1 .24[1] (1988). Additionally, federal legislation modifies
some aspects of the carriers' liability. See generally 10 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts§ 1083 (3d ed. 1967); Sorkin, supra.
Several states also impose higher standards of care on warehousemen. See Riegert & Braucher,
supra note 236 at 30 and n.22.
237. 230 Neb. 832, 434 N.W.2d 17, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 148 (1989). Prof.
Tang Thi Thanh Trai Le contributed to the discussion of this case.
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warehouseman, and the jury returned a verdict for Consolidated. On appeal the
court affirmed, finding no error. In the course of its opinion, the court discussed
whether Consolidated was liable as a carrier or a warehouseman. Citing cases
from other jurisdictions, the court ruled that once the consignee of goods (here,
the buyer) refused to accept a tender of delivery by the carrier, the carrier ceases
to be a carrier and becomes a warehouseman. Thus when the buyer rejected the
goods, Consolidated became a warehouseman and was liable only for losses
attributable to its own negligence. The court then ruled that when the carrierturned-warehouseman accepts instructions from the bailor (here, the seller) to
ship the goods to the specified location, he again becomes a carrier.

ARTICLE SIX (BULK SALES)
For the most part, the article 6 cases decided during the survey period
grappled with issues that are familiar to bulk sales aficionados. The provision
that spawned the most reported cases during this survey period is section
6-103(3), which excepts from article 6 "(t]ransfers in settlement or realization
of a lien or other security interest." This exception is no stranger to the
appellate courts, having given rise to a number of different interpretations. 238
Aligning itself with several other courts that have considered the issue, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that section 6-103(3) exempts from article 6
the transfer of collateral encumbered by a perfected security interest when all
the consideration paid by the transfer goes to satisfy the secured debt, regardless
of whether the collateral is transferred to a person other than the secured
party. 239 Inasmuch as the secured party's priority over the unsecured creditors
would have entitled the secured party to reach the entire proceeds of an article 9
foreclosure sale, the unsecured creditors also are not entitled to share in the
proceeds when the collateral is liquidated at a bulk sale.
Affording similar deference to article 9 security interests, a recent Oklahoma
opinion applied section 6-103(3) to a noncomplying bulk transfer of collateral
when the proceeds exceeded the size of the secured indebtedness. 240 The defendant bought the collateral (inventory of an auto parts store) for $55,000, of
which $51,027. 90 was paid to the secured party in full satisfaction of the
secured debt. Interpreting section 6-103(3) to exclude a bulk sale "only if
settlement of a security interest is the purpose of the transfer," 241 the court held
that payment of the secured debt was "merely an incident of the sale of the parts
store assets to defendant" 242 and therefore that the bulk transfer was not within
238. For a synopsis of the various constructions that courts have given to§ 6-103(3), see Harris,
Practicing Under Existing Bulk Sales Law-And a Look at the Future of Article 6, 22 U.C.C. L.J.
195, 204 (1990).
239. River City Prods., Inc. v. AEJ, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 452, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1600, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1319 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
240. Mid-America Indus., Inc. v. Ketchie, 767 P.2d 416, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1174 (Okla. 1989).
241. 767 P.2d at 418, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1176.
242. Id. at 419, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1177.
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the exception of section 6-103(3). As a consequence of his failure to comply with
article 6, the noncomplying buyer-defendant became personally liable for the
value of the property transferred or the amount paid therefore. 243 Although that
amount was $55,000, the court reduced the buyer's liability by the amount paid
to the secured party. Its reasoning was similar to that of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals: article 6 neither impairs a valid article 9 security interest nor affects
article 9 remedies. 244 Accordingly, the hold of a perfected security interest in the
transferred property is entitled to recover the proceeds of the sale.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently addressed yet another
variation of this theme. 245 Kizer granted a security interest in existing and afteracquired inventory to Malone & Hyde, Inc. ("M&H"). Among the debts
secured by the collateral was Kizer's obligation to pay for inventory he bought
from M&H. Following his default, Kizer signed a Notice of Default and
Transfer of Possession Agreement, pursuant to which Kizer transferred to
M & H certain property, including the collateral, in return for a release of his
liability to M&H. Adopting the view that the exception in section 6-103(3)
applied only when the entire consideration is used to satisfy the secured debt,
the court held that section 6-103( 3) excluded the transfer at issue from article 6.
In so holding, the court acknowledged that "an unsecured creditor of the
transferor is not prejudiced by a transfer of assets that satisfies the security
interest of a transferee who already has priority over the unsecured creditor." 246
Revised article 6, which has been approved for enactment by the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, clarifies the applicability of article 6 to sales of collateral. 247 It specifically
provides that revised article 6 does not apply to (a) a transfer of collateral to a
243. Article 6 provides that a noncomplying bulk transfer is "ineffective" against the creditors of
the transferor. U.C.C. §§ 6-104(1), 6-105. In the view of some courts, the only remedies available to
aggrieved creditors are those that enable the creditors to reach the transferred goods. Other courts
permit the imposition of personal liability on the noncomplying transferee in bulk. See generally
Harris, supra note 1, at 216-17. The opinion under discussion relies on Darby v. Ewing's Home
Furnishings, 278 F. Supp. 917, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 198 (W.D. Okla. 1967), which
relied upon Oklahoma's enactment of optional § 6- 106 as a ground for imposing personal liability
on the noncomplying buyer.
244. See Mid-American Indus., 767 P.2d at 420, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 1179;
River City Prods, 774 S.W.2d at 453, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1322. For an exhaustive
discussion of the effect of article 6 on article 9 security interests, see Harris, The Interaction of
Articles 6 and 9 of The Uniform Commercial Code, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 179 ( 1986 ).
245. Peerless Packing, Inc. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 376 S.E.2d 161, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 196 (W. Va. 1988).
246. 376 S.E.2d at 165, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 201. In addition, the court
treated the transaction as a retenti~n of collateral by the secured party pursuant to § 9-505,
notwithstanding that the Transfer of Possession Agreement authorized the secured party to sell the
collateral at a private sale after a reasonable period. The court also affirmed the directed verdict
entered in favor of the secured party on the creditor's claim of unjust enrichment.
247. Revised article 6 (cited herein as "revised U.C.C. § ") was promulgated for those states
that are reluctant to follow the sponsors' primary recommendation that article 6 be repealed and
bulk sales left unregulated. Highlights of the revised article are summarized in Frisch & Wladis,
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 44 Bus. Law. 1445, 1496-97
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secured party pursuant to section 9-503; 248 (b) a sale of collateral pursuant to
section 9-504; 249 (c) retention of collateral pursuant to section 9-505; 250 and, (d)
a sale of an asset encumbered by a security interest if (i) all the proceeds of the
sale are applied to the secured debt or (ii) the security interest is enforceable
against the asset after it has been sold to the buyer and the net contract price is
zero. 251 Additionally, the revised article excludes a sale of assets having a value,
net of liens and security interests, of less than $10,000. 252 This exception would
have excluded the transaction in the Oklahoma case altogether, on the theory
that the recovery to creditors from relatively small sales is unlikely to justify the
costs of compliance with the article. 253
A final case worthy of note is the second appeal in Stone's Pharmacy, Inc. v.
Pharmacy Accounting Management, lnc. 254 That case revolved around a typical
fact pattern: the transferor in bulk had filed for bankruptcy. 255 Applying Texas
law, the Eighth Circuit held that the bankrupt transferor was not a necessary
party to an aggrieved creditor's action against a noncomplying bulk buyer and
that the automatic stay did not affect the creditor's right to seek to assemble all
the transferred assets for proper distribution. Although the transferor's bankruptcy trustee might have enjoyed the right to avoid the bulk transfer under the
Bankruptcy Code, 256 the court observed that the transferor's bankruptcy trustee
appears not to have pursued the bulk transfer claim in the bankruptcy proceeding or otherwise. Had the trustee done so, the aggrieved creditor probably
would have been precluded from asserting its claim against the noncomplying
transferee. Nothing in revised article 6 would change the result in Stone's

Pharmacy.

( 1989). For a more detailed discussion, see Harris, supra note 1, passim. Utah has enacted revised
article 6.
248. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(b).
249. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(c).
250. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(d). This would have excluded the transaction in West Virginia
case.
251. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(e)(i) & (ii). Subsection (i) would have excluded the transaction
in Kentucky case. Subsection (ii) excludes sales in which the only consideration passing to the seller
is the assumption of the secured debt.
252. Revised U.C.C. § 6-103(3)(1)(i).
253. See revised Uniform Commercial Code§ 6-103 Official Comment 7.
254. 875 F.2d 665, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1179 (8th Cir. 1989). The prior appeal
appears at 812 F.2d 1063, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 206 (8th Cir. 1987).
255. For example, this was the case in Peerless Packing, Inc. v. Malone and Hyde Inc., 376
S.E.2d 161, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 196 (W. Va. 1988).
256. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988). Section 6-107(8) of revised article 6 attempts to preclude a
bankruptcy trustee from attacking a noncomplying bulk sale. It provides in part that "(a] buyer's
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6-104(1) does not ... (ii) render the sale
ineffective, void, or voidable ... "

